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The main objective of this research is to propose some
directions concerning logistic development for the Republic
of Korea Army (ROKA). In particular, it concerns modern
concepts such as integrated logistics support (ILS)
.
Traditionally, Korean logistics has been treated as
secondary. But, in the current situation, attention must be
placed on logistics.
This thesis introduces historical and geographical
circumstances of the Korean peninsula and appraises mili-
tary problems, especially logistics. It compares South and
North Korea's military powers and then analyzes the rela-
tionship between EOK and US. It proceeds with setting the
concept of modern military logistics and explaining some ILS
aspects concretely. It gives insights to logistics in the
system life cycle including approaches to the cost-side as
well as to effectiveness. For the decision-maker, the life-
cycle cost (LCC) model should be considered during the
acquisition cycle to assure proper logistics development.
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I. INTBODDCTION
The logistic system concept and the technology oz logis-
tics have made remarkable progress and also gained substan-
tial attention among business executives during the last two
decades. Also, the systems approach in looking at logistics
has been recognized within industry and throughout the busi-
ness world. Logistics is now considered to be a productive
functional area that can be managed to increase the profit-
ability of a company.
Traditionally, in their effort to reduce cost and
improve profit, businessmen concentrated their effort on the
manufacturing part of the enterprise. Production techniques
were constantly improved; however, the efforts to reduce
costs within the field of production in many companies have
reached a point where relatively little can be gained.
Consequently, business managers now turn their attention to
the non- manufacturing operations will include functions such
as procurement, transportation, warehousing, inventory
control and material handling, all of which are considered
integral parts of logistics.
Needless to say, in non-profit oriented organizations,
especially in Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) , the logistics
function has become a major part of the activity, both in
terms of scale and importance. k well organized and prop-
erly managed logistics system is essential foe the EOK Army
in order to carry out his missicns in peace time as well as
war time.
Considerable time and efforts have been devoted toward
the development of credible military strategic and tactical
doctrines to define ROK national defense. Various strat-
egies are continually under review to find better methods of
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projecting military power. But through this process logis-
tics has long teen relegated to a . category of secondary
importance. In many cases, the ::ru::;ial logistics problems
are considered as troublesome jobs, and then they are much
less interested, investigated and resolved in our country.
Moreover, the systems approach in looking at logistics
involved designing it and managing it as a whole function
rather than as a series of discrete, independent ones. If
their independence and interrelationship are not recognized,
sub-optimization will often occur with a resulting reduced
efficiency and overall results for the organization.
One way to avoid the above and to improve the way of
thinking and the organizational performance would be to
integrate the system and to inform and educate the members
of the organization atout existing theories and ideas within
the field. A review of historical and current logistical
realities, and their impacts on readiness will reinforce the
critical necessity to examine logistical implications. But
in analyzing any subject, it might be desirable to reduce it
to simple terms and to show them in logical relationships.
This thesis research is based on published definitions
and explanations of the concept of military logistics. The
purpose of this thesis research is to analyze the environ-
ment of current Republic of Korea (ROK) military and it's
military problems, and to develop the modernized concept
such as Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) and Life-Cycle
Cost (LCC) model.
Chapter two deals with the reality of Korean peninsula
and the relationships between RCK and US. It also describes
the military problems such as military imbalance and uncer-
tainty, and suggests some alternatives.
Chapter three is concerned with setting the concept of
modern military logistics which indicates the appropriate
directions for ROK military improvement.
1 1
Chapter four describes the background and concept, the
explanation of elements, and the application and planning
process of ILS. This chapter emphasizes the training
aspects of the ILS personnel and the teamwork and some
considerations in readiness.
Chapter five studies the logistics in the systeci life
cycle and the cost-effectiveness analysis during acquisition
process. This chapter illustrates' application of Life-Cycle
Cost (LCC) model to appraise cost-side for decision- maker.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the direction and
guidance of their advisor. Professor '-1. G. Sovereign, and
co-advisor. Professor P. M. Carrick in completing this
thesis. In particular, the authors are very thankful to the
colleagues and families for their helpful advice, criticism,
and encouragement.
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II. THE ENVIRONMENT OF R.O.K. MILITARY
A- THE EEALITY IN KOREAN PENINSULA
'^
• Ih.^ St r a t et^ic Loca ti on and Worth
Korea is located in the heart of the Far East. This
fundainental fact of geographic location has always been a
major factor in Koreans history. Surrounded by the major
powers of Asia and the Pacific - each vitally interested in
controlling the strategically located country - Korea has
become many times a battleground in a struggle for power.
To the southeast, only 120 miles distant, lies Honshu, the
principal island of Japan. To the west, at about same
distance, lies the Shantung peninsula of China. Manchuria,
the northerneast province of China, shares most of Korea's
northern boundary. Finally, in the northeast, for 11 miles
along the Tumen River, lies the Soviet Union. As a penin-
sula it has served as a bridge between powers on the conti-
nent of Asia and powers in the Pacific. [ Eef . 1: p- 3]
In other words, a peninsula location has both the
advantage of easy access to adjacent culture when our nation
was strong and the disadvantage of becoming the target of
aggressive neighbors when our nation was weak [Eef. 2: p.
13].
Historically, we can find out the latest main events
related to strategic location cf Korean peninsula. About
360 years ago, the Japanese dictator, Hideyoshi, dreamt of
conquering Chiila, but these dreams were shattered on the
Korean land bridge, partly hecause of the attacks by
Koreans on the Japanese communication lines. However, by
the end of nineteenth century, when Japan was developing
into a modern power, the political, economic, and military
13
pressure was renewed, and Japan got its first foothold on
the continent of Asia by taking over Korea. Some of the
battles of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 were fought on
the plains of Korea. Ten years later Japan came into
conflict with Russia, and again the Korean peninsula was the
scene of tattle between its aggressive neighbors. After a
short protectorate, Japan annexed Korea outright in 19 10,
and Japan possessed Korea for the next thirty-six years.
[Ref. 1: p. 6]
On August 15 1945 , the Korean peninsula was divided
into two Koreas at the 38th parallel. It was initially
designated to serve simply as a line of demarcation for the
acceptance of Japanese surrender by Soviet and American
troops. But the line - a line of convenience - soon hard-
ened into a solid boundary. This line was become as the
"international frontier" between the Communist-dominated
world and the Free world. [Ref. 1: p. 7]
On June 25 19 50, The North Korean troops swept
across the 38th parallel, slicing in four columns into the
South Korea with the aim of destroying the ROK government.
The Korean war immediately became a matter of world interest
because of the importance of Korea's geographical location.
The simple fact of geographical location once more became
fundamental in Korea's history. [Ref. 1: p. 7]
These days, the Korean peninsula is recognized as
one of dangerous areas in the world. The danger from the
region is underscored by the Soviet Unions' shooting down of
a South Korean civilian airliner and by the North Korean's
aggressive attitudes: invasion tunnels dug under the demil-
iteriz6d zone (DHZ) , i ambushes EOK and US soldiers, subver-
sive efforts, a constant stream of bellicose propaganda from
1 North Korea uses tunnel operations under the DMZ as
part of their overall concept ex war. Three large tunnels
nave been discovered under rhe DMZ and as many as 17 others
are suspected.
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Hadio Pyoiigyong and provocative incidents such as the Eangon
bombing as a recent evidence. [Ref. 3: p. 29]
However, someone argued that the division of Korea
satisfies at least the minimum ret^uirements of all of the
great powers with interest in Korea [Ref. 4: p. 5], In
other words, the Korean peninsula can be recognized as a
very important buffer zone between Communist powers and Free
powers.
Specifically, the Korean peninsula is the one area
in the Northeast/Western Pacific Basin where the interests
of the four major regional powers - Japan, Peoples' EepuxDlic
of China, USSR, and US - intersect directly and signifi-
cantly [Eef. 5: p. 69]. The maintenance of the peace and
security on the Korean peninsula is "essential" to peace and
security of East Asia, including Japan, and is "vital" to
the security of the United States.
2
If a conflict breaks out in the Korean peninsula,
the intervention of related super powers - US, USSR, China
and Japan - will be indispensable. So, we can easily guess
that a conflict in this area could lead to World War III.
Therefore, the stabilization of the Korean Peninsula is very
important to keep peace in the world as well as in the
Western Pacific and Northeast Asian areas.
2. I^ajor Power Balance around Korea
Northeast Asia ranks second only to central Europe
as the most heavily-armed region of the globe. Ihe Soviet
union and China have established a military standoff along
the Amour and Ussuri Rivers dividing Manchuria and eastern
Siberia [Eef. 4: p. 1]. These days, nonhostile/nonaligined
2This is derived from the Jcient Statement between Korea
and U.SfNov 14, 1983), and between Korea and Japan (Sep 8,
1984) .
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China represents an important counter balance to the Soviets
influence in the area [Ref. 6: p. 50].
The Republic of China, on the small island of
Taiwan, has built a modern military establishment to defend
itself against any attempt by Peking to liberate the only
Chinese province outside its control [Ref. 4: p. 1].
Soviet military capabilities in the region continue
to improve, providing greater opportunities for the Soviets
to exert their influence. The Soviets have expanded their
naval presence and strengthened their overall warfighting
capabilities. Although the majority of Soviet land forces
are positioned along the Sino-Scviet border, their presence
greatly influences the military balances in Northeast Asia.
Soviet deploys 52 divisions plus 1 corps, 1300 frontal avia-
tion units, 3 18 ships and 410 naval aviation units in the
region. ^with these military force, the Soviet actively
intimidate POK, US and allies in the region and support the
aggressive polices of North Korea. The improvement of the
Soviet and North Korea pose the greatest threat to HOK, US
and allied interests in the region. In view of growing
threats to regional security, close defense corporation and
collective efforts are essential. [Ref. 6: pp. 5-49]
The Japanese are constitutionally restricted to
maintaining only a defensive military force. The Japanese
Self-Defense Forces, although well-eguiped and well-trained,
remain small in comparison with those of other countries.
Table I represents a comparison of the major forces of the
DS and Japan. Japanese defense budgets are increasing
slowly in recognition of the threat. Japan will continue to
rely on the United States to counter any serious military
threat. However, US bases in Japan continue to play a vital
strategic role in providing US forces continuous access to
the region. [Ref. 6; p, 49]
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To keep the military balance in the region, the
United States deploys 1 infantry iivisions, 1 or 2 carrier
battle groups, 10 tactical fighter squadrons, 1 marine
amphibious force and 1 bomber wing, and provides a nuclear
"umbrella". The US also maintains important bilateral
security arrangements with RCK, Japan and the Republic of
China. 3 [Ref. 6: p. 42]
^The first formal security commitment of the United
States was the mutual security treaty with the Philippines^
which came into effect in 1952. This was followed by mutual
security treaties with JapanM952), The Republic of
Korea (1954) and the Republic of China (1955).
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3. Militarx Forces in North Korea, and, South Korea
Since the Korean Armistice of 1953, both North Korea
and HOK have steadily rebuilt their armed forces with the
assistance of their superpower patrons. This section
describes the build-up in the North, and ROK and North Korea
forces comparison,
a. Build-up in the North
The North Korean emphasis on the use of conven-
tional military force to "reunify" the Korean peninsula
stems from a communist party decision in the late 1960s
[Ref. 7: p. 97]- Beginning in 1962 Kim Il-3ung put forward
a refined doctrine of four main points generally referred to
as the party's "four point military line." The new doctrine
stressed the need for: training a cadre army in which each
man was prepared to assume the responsibilities of the next
higher rank-known as cadrif icat ion; adapting modern military
techniques to the conditions of North Korea's many mountains
and long coastlines; raising a nation in arms in which "the
entire people, holding a weapon in one hand and a sickle in
the other should reliably safeguard our socialist homeland";
and assuring the means of protracted struggle by a program
to "build up zones of military strategic importance, develop
the munitions industry, and create reserves of necessary
materials." In October 1966, Kim called upon the North
Korean Army to use flexibly both regular conventional and
irregular guerrilla warfare tactics during possible conflict
arising out of confrontations with South Korea. [Ref. 9: p.
226]
North Korea's most substantial force increases
occurred after the North Korea enunciated a policy of peace
and reconciliation with South Korea in 196 9.
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The impressive gains in the strength of the North Korean
forces are evident from a ten-}'ear and eight-year compari-
sons presented Table II It shows that the North Korean Army
has doubled to 40 divisions and 25 special forces brigades.
Its inventory of tube artillery similarly has undergone a
two fold increase. Its tanks and armored personnel carriers
have multiplied by a factor of three and ten respectively.
[Ref. 7: p. 97]
TABLE II









Source: The Posture of the Army and Department of tiie
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6, 100 7,200 8,000
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These days, the North Korea is producing some
300 tracked vehicles per year, about equally divided between
tanks, AFCs, and self-propelled artillery [Ref. 7: p. 94].
The North Korea deploys 3 tank corps (each corps has three
divisions) in the western end of the DMZ, according to
Japanese Sankey Newspaper report (September 23, 84). Enough
armor now is available to equip several armored divisions, a
19
few independent armored brigades, as well as some mechanized
and motor divisions.* Tube artillery has been in production
since the late 1960s and includes tne full complement of
Soviet designs. It is evident from Table II that the
artillery holdings of North Korean forces are substantial.
[Ref. 10: pp. 64-65]
Assuming that most of the artillery will be
located in the western end of the DMZ. We note that North
Korean ground forces have sufficient powers to attempt four
simultaneous breakthrough operations in the first echelon.
Each point of attack can be allocated 500 artillery pieces,
150 tanks and assault guns, and a number of infantry
regiments. For breakthrough operations the relevant norms^
are the density (number per kilometer of front in the break-
through sector) of forces deployed. These are summarized in
Table III for the Soviets in WWII, their current doctrine,
and for the North Koreans today. [Eef. 7: p. 98]
According to General Don Starry, the North
Koreans would use three echelons of forces in the offensive.
The initial assault would comprise an artillery barrage
followed by a "massive blow of infantry and tanks" - to
quote the Soviets - with breakthroughs exploited by two
follow-on echelons made up of tank and mechanized infantry
divisions. The breakthrough attempts would be assisted by
combat engineers and by elite infantry called ranger/
commandos in North Korea. Kim Il-Sung has dramatically
increased the size of these forces so that they now number
about 100,000. Of these forces, about 70% are thought to be
* According to the Military Balance ( 1983- 1 984) , the North
Korea has 2 armored divisions, 5 armored brigades and 3
motor infantry divisions [Eef. 11: p. 93].
^From "battles" against German, the Soviets developed a
set of rules - they call them "norms" - derived from consid-
erable data, as well as the spilling of a lot of blood.
These data are relevant to the present time, and in partic-
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Source: Armed Forces Journal International,
September 1984
assigned to the ground units, with their primary mission
probably the task of assisting in breaking through the
formidable EOK defenses. The function of the tunnels under
the DMZ now becomes clear: the survivable insertion beyond
the DMZ of ranger commandos into the ROK defense in depth.
Ranger /commandos assigned to the North Korean
Navy will go after ROK facilities on or near the coasts.
They will arrive in fast boats escorted by covering crafts.
Other fast boats will provide fire-support at the landing
sites simultaneously.
The Ranger commandos assigned to the Air Force
will be lifted via AN-2 transport. North Korea has
purchased and operates about 250 AN-2 aircraft, each capable
of carrying about 10 fully eguipped paratroops. These
propeller-driven biplanes are suitable for low-level,
terrain-following flight, and are a cheap means of inserting
21
ranger/commandos at communication sites, ground control
intercept facilities and EOK and US airbases. North Korea's
ranger/commandos probably will be equipped with small arms
and satchel charges to destroy ROK and US airplanes.
[Ref. 7: p. 103]
Moreover/ they can be expected to target all
senior political and military officals, US and RCK, as was
attempted in the "Blue House raid" in January, 1963
[Ref. 10: p. 65]. Apparently, the North Korea has built up
an Army that is now the size of the US Army and has the
third largest Army in the communist world, exceeded only by
China and the Soviet Union. Now, the North Korea estab-
lishes the ability to wage a multi-dimensional war with as
little as 12 hours warning [Ref. 7: pp. 94-104].
b. South and North Korea Military Forces Comparison
The impact of the North Korean military build-up
on the regional balance^ can be seen in Table IV. Several
years ago, most security analysts took comfort from the fact
that the F.OK Army was much larger than its Northern
counterpart. Today, the situation is reversed. The Army of
the North Korea numbers more than 700,000 men compared to
540,000 men in the ROK Army. When suppression systems are
combined, we see that the north enjoys almost a 3:1 advan-
tage in artillery. But the numbers do not disclose the
longer range and higher firing rates of the northern-
produced equipment, which follow Soviet designs. The North
also enjoys a qualitative and substantial advantage in
tanks. North Korea has advanced from T-54/55 tanks to
T-62s, while ROK forces still have about 300 of the outdated
^Military balance is the comparison of the intensity and
duration of war that can be waged by the operational weapons
(i.e., military capability) cf one nation versus that of
another nation [Ref- 12: p. 31]-
22
TABLE IV
BOK and North Korea Force Comparisons: 1 983




































Sources: The Posture of the Army and Department
of the Army Budget Estimates for FY 1985
and the Military Balance (1933-1984)
-47 tanks in services'' [Ref. 7; p. 97]- One way to
immarize the military balance is to form ratios of the
Qportant categories of equipment for the years 1970 and
)80.
"^According to the Military Balance ( 1 983- 1 984 )- the North
)rea has 300 T-34, 2200 T-347- 55/-62 , 175 Type-59 MBT, 100
r-76 and 50 type-52, while the fiOK has 1200 M-47/-48
Kef. 11: pp. 93-94].
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The ratios for important military force elements are given
in figure 2.1. North Korea has turned everything in his
favor in just 10 years. Figure 2.1 shows the North Korean
advantage in force ratios; 2.5:1 in tanks, 4:1 in artillery
and heavy mortars, and a little more than 1:1 in personnel.





















Source: Armed Forces Journal International (Sept 198U)
Figure 2.1 Force Ratios for Ground Forces and Equipment.
The North Korean Navy(NKN) is numerically
superior to ROK Navy (ROKN) and is an offensive force, while
the ECKN is still a coastal defense force- The NKN can
threaten surface ships, combatant and merchant, with some 21
diesel submarines. It is able to mine the waters in and
around several important ROK ports, e.g., Pusan and Pohang.
They can also insert the naval part of the ranger/commando
24
troops into the south in escorted amphiLious craft [Ref. 7:
p. 104]. The HOKN has no submarines for operation. Even if
it had them, the naval balance would not change greatly
since North Korea depends for less than the South on seal-
anes for trade or resupply of combat material. Submarines
would, however, be useful for patrolling coastal waters
against North Korean submarines. In all. North Korea has
more than 500 fighting ships^ with 33,500 men, compared with
about 100 fighting ships with 29,000, which is excluding
marine members, for the ROKN. [Ref. 10: p. 66]
The Air Forces of both sides still hold equip-
ment dating to the 1950 War: nearly 80 F-86Fs are still
flying in the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) and about 300 MIG-15/17s
are operational in the North. The ROKAF also fields about
60 F-4s and 250 F-5s- A co- production agreement has been
established with the United States for the ROKAF to
modernize its F-5 inventory to F-5Es. The molern aircraft
of North Korea consist of roughly 100 WIG-21s. The North
Koreans also have a Chinese version of the MIG- 19 (about
150) . Ground attack aircraft are made up of 20 Su-7s and 60
Il-28s. There are 60 helicopters in the inventory with
early Soviet MI-4 and MI-8 models predominating. In all,
the balance in airpower shows about 600 combat aircraft with
51,000 men in the North, as contrasted with roughly 400 ROK
aircraft and 33,000 men.^ [Ref. 10: p. 66]
^According to the Military Balance ( 1983- 1984) , the North
Korea has 18 SOV FAC (H) , 32 large patrol craft, 151 FAC(G}_,
182 FAC(T), 30 coastal patrol craft, 9 LCU, 15 LCil and 75
Nampo landing craft while the South Korea has 11 US
destroyers, 8 frigates, 3 US Auk Corvettes, 11 FAC (M) , 8 US
Cape Large Patrol Craft, 28 coastal patrol craft, 8
MSC-268/-294 coastal minesweepers, 1 fline Sweeping boat and
24 US landing ships, and on order: 1 sub, 7 corvettes, 20
FAC(M), 75 Harpoon SSM [Ref. 11: pp. 93-94].
"^According to the iMilitary Balance, the North Korea has
740 combat aircraft: 70 IL-28, 20 SU-/, 290 HIG-15/-17, 100
MIG-19, 100 .^IG-19/Q-5 and 160 :iIG-21 while the South Korea
has 450 combat aircraft: 250 F-5A/B/E/F, 70 F-36F, 6 A-10,
70 F-4D/E, 24 OV-10G, 10 RF-5A and 20 S-2A/F [Ref. 11: p-
94]. I r
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January 1984, the Joint of Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
analyzed the military power balance on the Korean peninsula.

























































































































































NORTH KOREA ^^^ SOUTH KOREA US.
Source: The Military Posture of JCS for FY 1985
Figure 2.2 Comparison of OS/EOK and North Korean Forces,
So far, the conventional military forces between
EOK and North Korea have been compared. These days economic
26
>wer is also recognized as a very important potential
.ctor vhich improves military force [Ref. 13: p. 11]«
,bie V shows the comparison ox economic size and military
lending of both Koreas.
TABLE V
j
Indicator of Economic Size and Military Spending, 1982
Indicator North Korea South Korea
Population 18.7 ( 19 ) 40.7 ( 42 )
(millions)
Armed Forces per 38.0 14.7
1,000 population
GNP (millions of 16200 69539
US dollars)
Per Capita Income 817 (>1000) 1611 (2000)
(US dollars)
Military Spending 3500 4783
(millions of dci.lars)
Military Spending 21.6 ( 24 ) 6. 9 ( 6 )
as % of GNP
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers 1972-1982;
{ ) represents the estimate of 1984 by source of[Bef. 7: pp. 94-97].
The South's consistently higher economic growth
ites have helped it achieve a jross national product in
)82 about over four times that of the North, and the
)uth 's economic edge is likely to become greater in the
itureio [Eef. 14: p. 27]. With a population of 19 million
lOAccording to the Hankook-Ilbo (Aug 31,84), the South
>rea has a GNP nearly five times that of North Korea (about
'> billion, compared with about 14 billion).
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people and a per capita income of less than $1000, North
Korea spends more money per capita on defense than any other
country in the world except Israel [Ref. 7: p. 94]. The EOK
spends 6% of its GNP on defense with a population of 42
million people while the North Korea lavishes about 24%.
However, North Korean industry is handicapped by old
m.achinery, and the heavy burden of defense seriously limits
the resources available to keep the economic moving
[Ref. 15: p. 93]. The ROK's per capita income is more than
$2000 and rising, though already more than three times that
in the North [Ref- 7: p. 97]. Given the enormous disparity
between the two economies, the fact that only 6% of the
South*s GNP, compared with 24% in the North, is devoted to
military-related expenditure is not as alarming as it might
appear at first glance. Time too, will take its toll on the
relative strength of the North's build-up, and the North's
slower economic growth makes holding on to its military
advantages more difficult. As a result. South will move
ahead of the North at an increasing tempo, and this is
shifting the balance of power en the peninsula. [Ref. 14:
p. 27]
In view of these points. President Chun Doo Hwan
announced as follows :ii
Military balance will be established when we invest 6
percent of GNP in military expenditure, assuming that we
can make economic growth continuously for 4 or 5 years
without conflict on the Korean peninsula.
Figure 2.3 shows this possiblity. The
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) esti-
mated that the military imbalance can be overcome by the end
of the 1980's. This scenario has prompted some observers to
1 iThis source is derived from the presss interview of
President Chun on August 21, 1984.
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predict a desperate move by North to make the most of what
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Figure 2.3 Military Spending in North and South Korea-
In conclusion. North Korea retains an edge over
the South only in military might. And this comparison, is
shifting in the South's favor. [ Ref . 15: p. 93]
B- THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROK AND OS
T • Polltic^ii §.D.iI l22G2.lical Relat iqnship
The last 100 years, since the establishment of US -
ROK relations in 18S2, were marked with ups and downs in the
bilateral relationship, but the friendship and the sense of
alliance formed a strong basis for their ties.
In retrospect, the United States, a pacific power
and leader of the free world, played a decisive role in
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liberating Korea in 19U5 and safeguarding the fate of the
Republic of Korea during a devastating war on the peninsula
in 19 50-53. Korea, in return, extended a helping hand when
America needed one in Vietnam.
Otherwise, smooth relations between the two coun-
tries were tangled, though momentarily, by the human rights
issue. The origin of these issues can largely Le attributed
to the different cultural and political backgrounds of the
two peoples. True to the proverb that the ground gets
harder after it rains, the Korean-American relationship
today can hardly be better. Korean President Chun Doo Hwan
was the first foreign head of countries invited to visit
Washington by President Reagan in January 1981, and the OS
troop withdrawal plan has been scrapped- [Ref. 16: P. 18]
In November 1983, President Reagan visited Seoul and
then reaffirmed the support for the Republic of Korea.
President Reagan said as follows in a speech to the National
Assembly, South Korea's legislature:
You are not alone, people of Korea. America is your
friend and we are with you.
As ROK joins the world community at an increasing
pace particularly since the economically prominent 1970s and
the increasing international recognition of Korea, 12 it now
seems to be concerning Americans more and more as they find
it necessary to build a true partnership.
In 1982, the bilateral trade totaled over 511
billion. The ROK becomes one of tne US most important
trading partners and the fifth largest market for the US
agricultural product, and also the United States is the
i2seoul in Korea is to be the site of the Asian Games in
1986 and the Olympics in 1983.
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EepuLlic of Korea's largest trading partner in exports as
veil as imports. i3
Trade has been brisk, and observers say the
expanding trade should be furthered to increase the mutual
relationship which they say is an important factor for
strengthening ties between the two peoples.
Today^ the political stability, economic: development
and international recognition of ROK help Korea to keep the
closer relationship with US, and also the increase of trade
has a positive effect on the security relationship between
two countries.
2 . Secur i t X Relationship
According to the text of Chun-Reagan Joint state-
ment (Nov, 1933), "the security of the Republic of Korea is
pivotal to the peace and stability of the Northeast Asia and
in turn vital to the security of the United States."
Now, the two countries have excellent security
relationships. However, the security relationships have
been marked with ups and downs according to US defense
policy.
The security relationship stemmed from the US mili-
tary landing at Inchon in South Korea in September 19U5.
Until Hay 1948, The South Korea was under control of US
military. The three-year occupation period was character-
ized by uncertainty and confusion, stemming iaryeiy from the
absence of a clearly formulated Jnited States policy for
Korea and intensification of the conflict between the United
States and Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet Union consol-
idated its power in North Korea, as the Nationalist govern-
ment of Chiang Kai-Shek began to falter in China, US
i3xhis source is derived from the text of Chun-Reagan
Joint Statement, which was announced on November 14, 1933-
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strategists began to question the long-run defensibility of
South Korea. By 19U7 it began to appear that South Korea
would become the only area of the Northeast x\sian continent
not under communist control. [ Eef - 8: p. 22]
Early in September, the US Policy Planning Staff
concluded that Korea's minor significance for American
national security seemed to justify disengagement. The JCS
also responded categorically that "from the standpoint of
military security, the United States has little strategic
interest in maintaining present troops and bases in
Korea. ..
"
On June 7, 1949, President Truman indicated as
follows:
The Korean Republic, by demonstrating the success and
tenacity of democracy in resisting communism, will stand
as a beacon to the people of Northern Asia m resisting
the communist forces which have overrun them.
[Bef. 17: p. 193]
Finally, on June 29, 1S49, the United States with-
drew the last of its combat forces from Korea, thus ending
almost four-years of military occupation.
Then, on January 12 19 50, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson made his famous speech excluding Korea and Formosa
from the American defense line in the Far East. That perim-
eter, said Acheson:
... runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to
the Rhykus (and) from the Ryukyus to the Philippine
Islands... So far as the military security of other
areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that
no person can guarantee these areas against military
attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee
is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of
practical relationship. [fief. 18: pp. 36-37]
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Less than six month later, a well-equipped North
Korean Army launched a massive assault across the 33th
parallel in pursuit of forcible reunification. President
Truman was shocked. As he has since written:
There vas now no doubt! The Republic of Korea needed
help at once if it was not to bs overrun. ilore seri-
ously, a Communist success in Korea would ^ut Red troops
and plans within easy striking distance oi Japan, and
Okinawa and Formosa would be open to attack from two
sides. [Eef. 18: p. 53]
The United States and ether countries, i* which are
under the the jurisdiction of the United Nations, intervened
to halt and push back this attack [ Ref . 5: p. 68],
On July 14, 1S50, President Ree formally placed all
EOK forces under UN command. This was by letter, and was
known as Taejon Agreement. After this Taejon Agreement, the
EOK took part in the Korean War as one of the United
Nations. In 1978, the operational command of the Armed
Forces was transfered from the United Nations Command in
Korea (headed by a United States general officer) to a newly
established joint US-ROK command structure, the Combined
Forces Command (CFC) . After the Korean War, the RCK-US
Mutual Defense Treaty was made in November 1954 and main-
tains until now.
On April 17 1968, President Park met President
Johnson in Honolulu. This meeting was aimed at assuring the
South Korean leader that his country's interests would not
be compromised by a Vietnamese peace agreement and at reaf-
firming the American military commitment to South Korea.
Mr. Johnson, in accordance with the terms of the ROK-US
Mutual Defense Treaty, reaffirmed the US readiness and
i*Other countries represent Australia. Belgium. Canada,
Colombia, Ethiopia, France^ Greece, Luxembourg^ Netherlands^
New Zeland, Philippines,
Africa, and united King(
, . .
Thailand, Turkey, Union of South
qdom.
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determination to repel armed attacks ajainst South Korea.
[Ref. 19: p. 153]
After one mcnth, EOK-US military leaders' meeting
was held in Washington in order to improve the ROK military
forces. This meeting was improved to the annual meeting^
which was the Security Consultative Meeting (3CH) . The 16th
SCH was held in Seoul on 9 May, 1984. The SCI1 has dedicated
in improving the EOK*s military capability and the EOK's
support for US Armed forces in Korea.
In 1969, the Nixon Doctrine was first enunciated
publicly at background press briefing in Guam. Nixon
Doctrine included three main parts: first, a posture of
gradual US military force reduction from its forward defense
positions in the Asia-Pacific region: second, an insistence
that the smaller and medium-sized powers of Asia must
provide for their main defense needs out of their own
resources - although US would provide some material help in
deserving cases - and third, an emphatic assurance that
vital American commitments and especially such treaty
commitments, as those involved with Korea, could be relied
upon [Ref. 20: p. 37]- ROK leadecs were very surprised at
the Nixon Doctrine and felt keenly the necessity of self-
reliance. US leaders began to negotiate to make sure that
in withdrawing some of US forces and they would continue to
provide the necessary military assistance to supplement our
own strong defense establishment [Ref. 21: p. 18]. In April
1971, an infantry division was pulled out during the Nixon
Administration. In 1975, the US free military aids
terminated. Meanwhile, the North Korea had improved its
military force with the four point military line since 1962.
In the beginning 1970s, the North Korea announced the
completion of preparation for war against ROK, and provoked
incidents frequently. In view of these environments, ROK
began to build up its Defense Industry.
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In March 197 7,. President Carter announced his inten-
tion of removing the remaining US ground combat forces, the
US Army Second Division. There was disagreement over
whether the withdrawal of the Second division was a prudent
risk, as the Carter administration maintained, or whether it
would shift the military balance and "lead to war," a posi-
tion taken by Major General John K. Singlaub, former chief
of staff of US 8th Army in Korea [Ref. 4: p. 57]. Moreover,
Dr. Lefever insisted as follows:
The abrupt and undebated decision to withdraw American
ground forces from Korea will nave a negative impact
upon the US position in Asia and more generally upon
America's capacity and determination to stand behind its
allies in a crisis [Ref. 3; p. 28].
However, Stuart and Joseph concluded that some US
forces were in excess of clearly identifiable military
requirement in Northeast Asia. Further, they recommended
significant reduction in US ground forces in Japan and Korea
[Ref, 4: p. 87], The total withdrawal plan was delayed and
then was rescinded in 1981 by the Reagan administration and
military realities in Northeast Asia.
The presence of American soldiers in Korea guaran-
tees the security of the Republic of Korea, frustrating the
unchanging Communist plot to invade the South at an oppor-
tune time. Major exercises, such as TEAM SPRIT, also demon-
strate allied cooperation and US reinforcement potential.
From a broader aspect, however, the US military
presence in Korea has an international implication. The
balance of power maintained on the peninsula with participa-
tion of the American forces contributes to the maintenance
of peace in Northeast Asia and the world as a whole.
[Ref. 16: pp. 18-19]
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C. MILITAEY PROBLEMS
In carrying out our policies toward peace on the Korean
peninsula, the Republic of Korea faces problems that are, at
least in part, military: military imbalance between North
and South Korea, uncertainty of US defense policy, geography
and logistics problems.
1
. MiJil^I^I. Imbalance between North and South Korea
The North Korea has made enormous improvements in
its armed forces during the past 3 years, enough to be of
real concern to the SOK. These improvement coupled with Kim
Il-sung's unpredictability, make for a serious problem. The
South Korea is really worrying about Kim Il-sung's "errati-
cism and the North Korean's aggressive Attitude." [Ref. 7:
p. 94]
Today, North Korea is superior to South Korea in
terms of the quantity of weapons, but the South Korea tries
to overcome the imbalance by reaching to better quality.
Moreover, the enormous disparity between the two economies
can help the South Korea to gain the military superiority in
the future. Therefore we can guess that North Korea will
make the most of what advantages it now has, before they
slip way.
Neither China nor the Soviet Union, both sponsors of
the North Korea, want a major conflict on the peninsula, but
no one is certain that either China or the Soviet Union
could restrain North korea if Kim Il-sung got the bit in his
teeth and decided to "go for it" [Ref. 7: p. 94]. Finally,
either the Soviet Union or China will support the North
Korea. Therefore, the support of the United States is
essential to defense of ROK national survival.
36
2 • Uncertainty of US Defense Policy
If North Korea invaded South Korea tomorrow, would
the US risk getting involved in a large-scale war to come to
the South's defense? This question is a real concern to the
Korean people. In a view of toth points, that is the gut
question underlying the at-times-uneasy relationship between
Washington and Seoul.
In November 1933, President Reagan spent just three
days in Korea answering it with a resounding "yes."
However, many of the actions taken by the United States in
Northeast Asia are also aspects of its global policies.
Despite the importance of Korea's geographical location,
Korea has been recognized less important to the United
States than either Japan or China [Ref. 4: pp. 3-5]. This
basic concept has negative effect on the evaluation of
Korea's strategic worth. Moreover, it's strategic worth has
been changed with ups and downs by US political situations.
In January 1975, President Carter used the Korean
affair as the major foreign policy for his election issue.
Not until 1975 was any US policy toward Korea influenced by
public opinion greatly.
In March 84, Americans' attitudes toward Korea were
expressed at the Asian study conference by William Katt.i^
He used the Gallup polls to research American's attitudes.
His main points are as follows:
1. One of the questionnaires is the degree of importance
of each countries for US national interests. The
result is represented in Table Vj.. Table VI shows
that the degree of importance of Korea is 15th and
that 66% of OS leaders and 43ib of general civilians
recognized the importance of Korea toward US.
Despite a relatively close economic relationship,
Korea is located at low degree. We note that there
is big gap between leaders and general civilians.
isxhe contents of this report are derived from the

















































































































































































































































Assuming that US decisive decision toward Korea
would be influenced by political change and public opinion,
the US support plan for Korea would be uncertain if there is
a conflict on the Korean peninsula.
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TAELE VII




1978 1979 1980 1982 1983
32 32 43 33 36
52 56 51 51 47
16 12 11 16 17
unit: %
^ • Gepgra^hj
A conflict in Korea would be decided primarily by
the effectiveness of the op£)csing ground forces.^^ The
attractive naval target for North Korea is the port of
Pusan, through which most of Korea's materiel would be
shipped during wartime. The EOK Navy and rear-area security
forces have the limited resources to prevent large-scale
North Korean amphibious attacks and infiltration. The
South 's anti-submarine capabilities are limited, however,
and the North's 21 submarines could affect efforts to
resupply the South with war material [Ref. U: pp. 80-31].
The North, with overland links to both China and the Soviet
Union, is not dependent on shipping at all.
Because the ridges of mountains in Korean peninsula
generally run north-south, both attacker and defender are
forced to operate in corridors. Should the attacking forces
be concentrated where defensive forces are weak, timely
reinforcement by the defender would be difficult. The
Taebaek mountain range is a particularly imposing barrier,
isolating EOK forces on the east coast from the bulk of the
forces in the west. Terrain also limits the usefulness of
1 *Most of contents of this subsection come directly from
[Ref. a: pp. 57-59].
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simple communications equipment, since communicdtion across
mountain ranges demands sophisticated equipment.
Squally significant in its effect on the South's
defense strategy is the location of Seoul, only forty kilo-
meters from the DMZ. The North Korean capital, Pyongyang,
on the other hand, is about 150 kilometers from the DMZ.
Seoul is the South's capital and its economic and political
heart with a population of nearly 10 million, more than 20
percent of the total population of South Korea [ P.ef . 14: p.
26], Once driven out of Seoul, RCK forces would find it
difficult tc regroup and to retake the city.
In a blitzkrieg invasion of Seoul, North Korean
armor would be forced to use the same invasion corridors it
used in the Korean War: the two corridors that merge into
one at Uijongbu, sixteen kilometers north of Seoul; and a
corridor further west-near Panmunjom and passing through
iMunsan. At key choke points along these corridors are
manned fortifications and concrete impediments that can be
dropped onto the roadway by blowing up their supports.
Invading tanks would be particularly vulnerable at these
points, since they would be exposed to fire from defenders
who are well dug in and therefore difficult to suppress with
artillery fire. While the roadblocks would not prevent an
armored advance, they would slow it, making it vulnerable to
air or ground fire.
In summary, the limitations imposed by terrain
combined with the South's anti-armor weapons are serious
obstacles to a blitzkrieg invasion from the North. The
experience of 1950, when North Korean tanks drove down the
peninsula unopposed, is not likely to be repeated. Still,
problems remain in the EOK's defenses.
One problem inherent in tne South's adoption of a
defensive posture is that the North can choose the place of
attack and the South has limited capability to reinforce it.
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Troops and supplies have to moved by truck, and driving east
or west below the DM Z is tortuous. The south' s helicopter
airlift capacity is insufficient to provide meaningful
resupply or reinforcement. Reinforcement of defenses on the
east coast would be most difficult, although since the area
is thinly populated and has few military targets, ROK forces
could trade space for time; no such luxury is available in
the invasion corridors leading to Seoul. [Sef- 4: pp.
57-59 ]
^ • L2di§t ics
Through the Korean War ( 1950- 1 953) and participation
in the Vietnam War (1 968- 1 973) , we obtained experience to be
able to wage modern war. Unfortunately, we obtained less
experience in the logistics field, because we waged the
Korean War under support of US and other U.N. countries and
participated in the Vietnam War under support of US. Little
experience in logistics in both wars has resulted in
neglecting the importance, of logistics.
Considerable effort and study have been devoted
toward the development of credible strategic and tactical
doctrine and training systems. Various strategies are
continually under review to find better methods of
projecting military capability under coordination with US.
Throughout this process, one central question has usually
been avoided and delayed: What about military logistics?
Logistics has been relegated to a category of secondary
importance. The idea that "logistics supports the weapon"
or in fact that logistics provides "support" still prevails.
Moreover, when South Korea rebuilt its Armed Forces
following the Korean War, it emphasized combat units rather
than support units. While this has little effect during the
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opening days of war, it affects the tide of battle as the
staying power of South Korean forces is weakened by thin
logistic support. [ Bef - 4: p. 80]
A forward defense, in which the defender cannot
afford to yield a great deal of territory, demands heavy
artillery and mortar bombardment and close air support.
Moreover, a heavy barrage of indirect fire spends a lot of
munitions in the first days of a conflict, and F.OK conven-
tional munitions in place may be inadei^uate. Also, the
logistics network for moving supplies from the port of Pusan
or airfields in the South to the combat area is thin, and
since they would come primarily from the United States,
would require weeks of transit time.
The worst is as follows. The US military exercise,
called "Pressure Point 8U," showed that the Army would begin
running out of key munitions and other items in the first
month of a war in South Korea and could be forced to accept
a stalemate because of shortages of critical supplies, i'^
Therefore, adequate stocks of conventional ammunition in the
theater would go a long way to enhancing South Korea'a
defense capability.
To increase these stocks, the United States could
assist the South in improving its munitions industry. The
Eepublic of Korea began to build the defense industry since
1975, but it faces some technical problems.
Despite of continuous economic growth, we are a
short of fund to improve the military capability. Vie spend
more on consumable items sach as food, clothes, facilities
and pay rather than on military hardware. Moreover, the ROK
National Assembly reduced FY 85 military expenditures to
5.5% of GNP.
1 "'This source is derived from Washington Post newspa-
pers: August 3, 1984.
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While strategies and tacti::s are quickly adopteJ to
changing situations and objectives, the logistics system
always need a large and complex process recuiring complete
and careful management to make sufficient changes in objec-
tives or results. Today, knowledgeable logistics leader-
ship, guidance, and policy are needed to create a single
logistics operation focused on attaining necessary military
capability in EOK Forces. [Ref- 5: pp. 85-86]
D. ALTEENATIVES TO SOLVE PROBLEMS
Our final goal on the peninsula is to keep peace first,
and then to establish "reunification" peacefully. First of
all, to establish this goal, we must never give Kim Il-sung
the opportunity to make a wrong decision such as "go for
it."
Our basic strategy is to improve our self-reliance under
close coordination with the United States. Cur hope is to
gain the balanced military as soon as possible. We believe
that the military balance can guarantee peace on the
peninsula. Relatively, we have more person resources and
economic size than North Korea. These factors can give us a
great military potential power. However, now North Korea's
military force is superior to that of South Korea. So, the
pressing need is to establish military balance on the Korean
peninsula.
Ve have some problems such as big military imbalance,
uncertainty of US defense policy, geography and logistics.
How do we overcome these problems and then reach military
balance? Possible alternatives are enormous, but the most
challenge is to improve military logistics. The reason is
that one of the weakness in ROK's military is logistics.
These days, military environments have been changing
rapidly everywhere in the world. Since world war II, the
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importance of logistics has beer stresssed at all level of
military activity.
For this importance of logistics, Fred Gluck stated
that
:
The importance of strategies and tactics notwith-
standing, 'modern' military logistics is the basis of
military power (the level and duration of war that can
be waged cy combat forces). Therefore, the effective
and efficient operation of "modern military logistics"
is critical to the safety and survival of US nation.
"Modern military logistics" must provide the assurance
that concept, structure, focus and management of mili-
tary logistics are present and effectively aligned to
provide for the need of today's military forces in
general and its combat forces in particular. [Eef- 22:
p. 14]
Modern military logistics is also critical to defend our
nation. If we fail to understand modern military logistics,
many problems will occur. Possible problems are as follows:
1. VJe can't make the test of defense budget efficiently
and effectively.
2. We can't establish an effective and efficient mili-
tary logistics operation.
3. We can't develop the logistics doctrine.
4. We can't measure productivity and effectiveness, or
perform valid trade-off analysis anywhere within the
total logistics environment.
5. We can't measure or compute capabilities to wage war
accurately.
6. We can't determine the extent of war that can be
waged by our own forces.
To solve logistics problems and improve our own forces,
we'd like to suggest as follows. First is to understand
modern military logistics fully and to set the concept of
modern military logistics which indicates the direction of
military logistics. Second is to establish the Integrated
logistics Supports with effective and efficient manner.
Third is to establish the rational acquisition process in
terms of Life-Cycle Cost model.
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III. THE SETTING OF MODEBN MIlIIARr LOGISTICS CONCEPT
To set the Modern .military Logistics Concept for ROK
military, it will be necessary to study the evolution of
logistics in world military history. After that, we
describe a proper concept of modern military logistics for
EOK's military improvement.
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY LOGISTICS
^ • I.h.§. Ssg^inninv^ Phase of Military; Logistics
Logistics activities were performed before the birth
of Christ. Demand forecasting, site selection, order
processing, inventory management, and packaging were
employed some 4000 years ago to save Egypt from the ravage
of seven years of famine. [Eef. 23: p. 10]
A first record in related to logistics did appear in
a book written in about B.C. 500 by Sun Tzu Wu.is This book
was called "the art of war", the oldest military treatise in
the world. He stated as:
The art of war is governed by five constant factors.
These are the Moral iaw. Heaven, Earth, the Commander,
and Method and discipline. By method and discipline are
to be understood the marshalling of the army in its
proper subdivisions, the gradation of rank among the
officers, the maintenance of roads by wnich supplies may
lead army, and the control of military expenditure,
[Eef. 24: p. 3]
We can also find the root of word logistics in
western history. Graham w. Rider investigated the origin of
the word "logistics" in his article, i''
1 8Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Ch» i State in China.
i''Most of contents of the rest of this subsection come
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In the beginnirig there were two words, "logistikos"
and "loyisticus". The first is Greek, the second, Latin,
and they both had same meaning - calculation or reasoning in
a mathematical sense. The first meaning , to reason mathe-
matically, has remained constant for centuries. The second
meaning of logistics back to some obscure early usage of the
latin root, "log-". Latham states that "logluguea", a noun
meaning lodge or hut, appeared in records dated 1350; and
"logio", a verb meaning lodge or dwell, appeared in 1380.
He attributes the French verb, logsr, meaning "to lodge" to
this Latin antecedent. It leads directly to the second
meaning of logistics. [Eef. 25: pp. 280-281]
As civilized societies grew put of the medieval age
and began to acquire sophistication, so too did the nature
of the warfare in which these societies engaged. Armies
grew in size, and the problems of administering them also
grew. Sometime near the year 1670 an adviser to the French
King, Louis XIV, proposed a solution for these military
problems in the form of a new staff structure for the army.
One of the newly created positions was that of Marechal
General des Logis, whose title came from the verb loger.
This officer was responsible for planning marches, selecting
camps, and regulating transportation and supply. This
instance appears as the first application of the new meaning
of logistics and the first organizational usage of logistics
as we recognize it today. Although we could go into greater
detail in investigating the origins of the logistics profes-
sion, it seems enough to say that someone has always had to
furnish supplies and transportation for military forces.
That office has had a number of titles down through history,
but it was the French who gave us the modern term logistics.
directly from [Ref. 26].
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Jomini first used the term "la logistique" which has
teen translated to English as logistics. He can be called
the "father" of military logistics. He drew upon his experi-
ences in a number of wars, principally from those campaigns
when he was a staff officer for Napoleon, to write the
following.
If it be acknowledged that the ancient logistics was
only a science of details for regulating everything
material in regard to marches; if it be asserted that he
functions of the staff embrace at this day the most
elevated functions cf strategy, it must be admitted also
that logistics is no longer merely a part of the science
of the staff- or rather that it is necessary to give it
another development, and to make of it a new science
which will not only be that of the staff but that of
generals-in- chief.
The duties of the Marechal General des Logis
expanded and took on new dimensions- [Ref. 26: p. 26]
2 . The Middle Phase of Mil it ary Logistics
After Joininie expanded the dimension of logistics.
Logistics did not long remain on this plane. In fact, it was-
eclipsed and, as we shall see, remained virtually so until
World War II. THe man who cast the shadow was none other
than Karl Von Clausewitz. In a very short of time, the
leading military men of the world adopted the Prussian
interpretation of Clausewitz 's theory of war. Since he makes
no mention of logistics in all of vom Kriege (On War) , the
concept of logistics lost most of military meaning that
Jomini had given it. For example, about 40 years later, in
1876, an English major general published a dictionary in
which he defined logistics as;
With a reference to military science, it is the study of
the military resources of countries, which focms part of
the information gathered by the intelligence department
of armies. [Eef. 26: p. 25]
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In 1895, Edward s. Farrow, aa instructor of tactics
at West point, brought logistics back toward its original
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In 1911, Comdr. C.T. Vcgeigesang, an instructor at
Naval War College defined logistics as:
Logistics comprehends all the operations conducted
outside the field of battle and which lead up to it. it
regulates the execution of those movements which in
combination become the function strategy. f Ref . 26: p.
26]
Logistics had not yet regained the position of a new
science of warfare accorded to it by Jomini. A bright did
appear in a book written in 1917 by Lt. Col. George C.
Thorjie. He attempted to define logistics from view point
of pure and applied logistics. In his preface, Thorpe says:
the terms 'pure' and 'applied' may be used with the same
meaning as to logistics as to other sciences. He defined
pure and applied logistics as:
Pure logistics is merely a scientific inquiry into the
theory of logistics - its sco^je and function in the
science of war^ with a broad outline of its organiza-
tion. Appliea logistics rests upon the pure, and
concerns itself, in accordance with general principles,
with the detailed manner of dividing labor in the logis-
tical field in the preparation for war and maintaining
war during its duration. [Ref. 27: p. 9]
He also argued as follows:
48
1. Logistics is all that part of war which is not
includad in Strategy and tactics.
2. Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the
conduct' of military operations: Logistics provides
the means therefore.
Thorpe's influence was not immediately felt. In
fact, many continued to regard logistics solely in terms of
its application. For example. Farrow revised his dictionary
again in 1918 and in it offered a definition of logistics
which was succinct in comparison with his earlier work:
Logistics - that branch of the military art which
embraces the details of moving and supplying armies.
[Ref. 26: p. 27]
A number of definitions of logistics that appeared
during the 1920's and 1930's said essentially the same
thing that Farrow said in his last revision. Logistics was
doldrums. Apparently, nothing of note was done organiza-
tionary or otherwise that could have given logistics a push
either in theory or in practice. However, WW II changed the
situation - it made logistics a household word.
3- Post-World War II Development of Logi stics
After WW II, two books were immediately published.
One vas "logistics in World War II" reported by the U.S. Army
service forces. By its introduction, logistics was defined
as:
Logistics is the branch of the military art which
embraces the details of the transport, cuartering, and
supply of troops in military operations. It also
embraces all military activities not included in the
terms "strategy" and "tactics." In this sense logistics
includes procurement, storage, and distribution of
equipment and supplies; transportation of troops and
cargo by land- sea, and air; construction and mainte-
nance of facilities: communication by wire, radio, and
the mails; care of the sick and wounded; and the induc-
tion, classification, assignment, welfare, and separa-
tion of personnel. [Ref. 26: p. 27]
49
Now this was a significant development for logis-
tics, and Thorpe's influence was felt. It occurred in one of
the largest organizations ever assembled by man. Since one
usually does not argue with success, logistics was accepted
in the postwar years as much mere than moving and supplying
armies - the concept was expanded to include construction,
communication, medicine, and personnel-
Another was "U.S. Naval Logistics in World War II"
written by Duncan Ballantine, He provides one of the first
broad-based definitions of the terra, when notes that:
"Logistics signifies the total process by which the
resources of a nation - material and human - are mobilized
and directed toward the accomplishment of military ends."
Broadly conceived, the logistics process is thus the means
where by the raw war-making capacity of the nation is trans-
formed into instruments of force ready to be employed in
pursuit of strategic or tactical objectives. 20 Ballantine
also stated that "Logistics is both economic and military
undertaking." He developed a theory which credited logistics
as the "bridge" between the two elements necessary for a
nation to wage war successfully - its military forces and
its economic capabilities. [Ref. 5: p. 29]
After WW II, the formal military organizations^ 1 and
scholars have devoted a great deal of their resources to the
research and study of military logistics. Its importance as
a function of war and as a primary organizational activity
is widely recognized and constantly stressed at all level of
command.
20Duncan s. Ballantine, D.s. Naval Logistics in the
second World War, Princeton University Press, p. 1, 1947.
2iMilitary organizations include DOD, JCS, U.S Army
Service Force, etc.
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In 1953, Zccles attempted to develop pure and
applied logistics which Thorpe suggested in 1917. He rede-
fined pure and applied logistics as:
Pure logistics is an abstract term used to indicate the
whole complex process where by the means of war neces-
sary to support a national strategy are determined-
procured, and finally distributed to the combat
commanders. Appllied logistics represents the everyday
practical application of this abstract process. The
applied logistics process of providing men materials
facilities and services comprises the performance of
many specialized and technical functions. [ Ref . 13: p.
16]
He also stated that both pure and applied logistics
can be roughly divided into two general classification:
mobilization logistics and operational logistics.
Mobilization logistics is the process that economic and
industrial resources are mobilized in order to create and
support the necessary combat forces and to maintain civil
economy and health. Operational logistics include both stra-
tegical logistics and tactical logistics. Before operational
logistics can be function, there must be the prior perform-
ance of the mobilization lagistics function. Eccles empha-
sized that an understanding of both pure logistics and the
broad aspect of applied logistics is essential to the exer-
cise of high command. [Ref. 13; p. 16]
In 196 1, Webster defined military logistics as:
The planing, handling and i aplsmentati on of personnel
(as in classification, movement. evacuation) and
material (as in production. distrioution. maintenance)
and facilities (as in construction, operation, distribu-
tion) and other related factors. 22
22webster's Third New International Dictionary. G.
Merriam company, publishers, Springfield, Mass., 196 1.
51
Further, a U.S. Air force technical report defines logistics
as follows;
The science of planning and carrying out the movement
and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive
sense. logistics pertains to those aspect of military
operations which deal with; (a) design and development,
acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, mainte-
nance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; (b)
oiovement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel;
{c\ acguisition or construction, maintenance, operation,
and disposition of facilities; and (d) acguisition or
furnishing of services. 23
In essence, logistics has primarily been oriented
to "system/product support" and has included the elements of
maintenance planning, test and support equipment, supply
support, transportation and handling, facilities, personnel
and training, technical data. 2*
Recently, logistics has been viewed on a much
broader scale and the field of logistics has been growing at
a rapid pace, stimulated primarily by the technological,
sociological, and economic trends in our world. Systems and
products have become more complex as technology advances,
and logistics requirements have increased in general. Not
only have the costs associated with system/product acquisi-
tion increased significantly in the past decade, but the
costs of logistic support have also been increasing at an
alarming rate. At same time, the current economic dilemma
of decreasing budgets combined with upward inflationary
trends results in less money available for the acquisition
of new systems and/or for the maintenance and support of
those items already in use [Ref. 28; p. 5]. In an attempt
23Gluck F. , Technical Eepcrt No. 5. A Compendum of
Authenticated Logistics Terms and Definitions, School of
Systems and Logistics, U.S. Air Force of Technology, WPAFB,
Ohio, 1970.
2*D0C Directive 4100.35, Development of Integrated
Logistics Support for Systems/Equipment, Department of
Defense, Washington, D.C., October 19/0
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to respond to the dynamics of thase situation, Graham W.
Rider (1970), the Society of Logistics Engineers (SOLS : 19 74)
and Fred Gluck(1979, 1932) tried to define military lojis-
tics from view point of each approach. In other words,
every one has been saying the same thing but with different
terms and at different levels of abstraction.
Graham W. Bider stated that logistics is conceived
at three different levels of purpose or function. These
three levels were defined as the social and economic purpose
of logistics at the highest level; the system processes or
steps through which the purpose is achieved at the second
level; and the work functions or organizational tasks that
must be perform to make the system work form the third level
of the definition of logistics [Eef. 26: p. 32]. His culmi-
nating definition of military logistics as:
Military logistics; The social and economic function of
Physical Supply and Physical Distribution that creates
time and place value for military goods and services. As
a military organizational system. the purpose of logis-
tics is" accomplished through the processes of
Requirements Determination, Acquisition, Distribution,
ana Conservation. The organizational work- functions or
physical tasks that must be performed to accomplish the
§urpose of military logistics are Traffic Management,
uPElYr Maintenance, and Facilities Engineering.[Eef. 26: p. 32]
SOLE has expanded the definition of logistics to:
The art and science of management, engineering, and
technical activities concerned with requirements,
design. and supplying and maintaining resources to
support objectives, plans, and opera tions- ^s
This definition is conceptual in nature, and support
the life cycle approach to the logistics. It includes both
business and military logistics considerations. In addition.
^SThis definition was established by the Society of
Logistics Engineer s (SOLE) , August 197^;.
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it addresses the est atlishment cf requirements in the early
phases of the life cycle and the subsequent design activi-
ties that precede production operations, product distribu-
tion, and the various aspects of sustaining system support
during consumer use. [Eef. 28: p. 6]
Pred Gluck attempted to define modern military
logistics from view point of weapons oriented logistics. 26
He defined modern military logistics as:
The integrated management cf those activities and
resources necessary to create and sustain some required
level of military capability [Eef. 29: p. 17].
Gluck commented his definition specifically as
follows. The term military logistics is of a higher order
than the terra logistics environment for military logistics
deals with the management of the logistics environment.
Therefore, in that: (1)the total logistics environment is
"organizationally f ractiona ted" (i. e. , broken into many small
specialized pieces) while having a single end product, the
most effective form of management is "integrative" rather
than the present "coordinati ve. "; (2) The identity of those
activities, agencies , etc. which compose the logistics envi-
ronment can be determined objective; and (3) the task/
objective of the logistics environment is to create and
sustain military capability. [Eef. 29: pp. 15-17]
Thus, our exploration of military logistics ends
with a current trend of logistics. It is a long way from the
original meaning of mathematical calculation and the later
added meaning of lodging troops and ordering marches. Along
the way, military scholars like Jomini and Thorpe have
Hi
Improved Effectiveness were published in Logistics Spectrum
(magazine) .
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claimed that logistics is a science^ but for most of the
time. it was neglected or relegated to a series of tasks.
[Ref. 26; p. 28]
WW I and WW II brought logistics to center stage for
military men. After WW II, a lot of military scholars and
formal organization tried to develop the logistics theory
and application.
Zccles developed pure and applied logistics theory
which Thorpe suggested. He tried to define military logis-
tics by dividing into mobilization and operational
logistics. Rider analyzed the evolution of the concept of
logistics, and then defined the military logistics from view
point of three kinds of level (social and economic, system
process, and work function). 2ccles and Rider defined mili-
tary logistics by dividing into several levels. Eccles
derived the definition of military logistics evolution in
prior 1953, Rider derived from the culmination of logistics
evolution prior 1970.
SOLE'S definition of logistics supports the life-
cycle approach to logistics. It emphasized that one must
employ a life-cycle approach in dealing with logistics
today. SOLE'S definition has recognized new approach in both
civilian society and military organizations.
Fred Gluck defined logistics from view point of
weapon oriented logistics, emphasized the necessity for
understanding military logistics. He enlarged the scope of
military logistics as follows:
1. military logistics is a major segment of the military
forces.
2. Military Logistics is one of three branches of the
[Military Forces. (the others being strategy and
tactics)
Military organizations defined logistics from view
point of each position and rec^uirement . However, those
definations have been recognized as unacceptable definition
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by military scholars like Gluck. Glack insisted that
"vintage World War II logistics" can provide only "suboptim-
ization", in today's military environment.
These days^ military environment is very flexible
and dynamics. The nature of society is changing, and science
and industry is producing new and more deadly weapons.
Therefore, the objective of modern war reached new heights
and the nature of war changed to conform [ Ref . 30: p. 27].
Every country, which participate in the future war^ will try
not only defeat opposite military force but also paralyze
the economic power in order to establish the political
objective. Therefore, offical definitions of military
logistics will te modified to respond to the dynamics of the
situation and to the nature of modern war.
B. A CONCEPT OF MODEEH flILITAEI LOGISTICS
The importance of Military logistics has been recognized
everywhere in the world. Many military scholars and formal
organization tried to define the military logistics in order
to improve military force.
In today's Korean military environment, the advanced
military logistics system is indispensable to improve our
military force.
Therefore, one of greatest challenges facing the
Ministry of National Defense today is more effective and
efficient operation of military logistics. Toward this end,
the following paragraphs are devoted to providing several
new perspectives relative to military logistics as a back-
ground for the formulation of a concept of modern military
logistics.
First of all, the concept of modern military logistics
must be viewed in at least four dimensions. These are as:
1. Modern military logistics must contribute to national
strategy.
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2. It must be recognized as a major segment of the mili-
tary forces.
3. It must be studied as one of three branches of mili-
tary science(the others being strategy and tactics).
4. It must indicate the direction of development of
military logistics system.
Viewing the entity of Military Logistics in the context
of these four dimensions, understanding its role and signif-
icance can be logically developed as follows in order to
derive the concept of modern logistics.
1. Future conflict in Korean peninsula, regardless of
the particular kind of war, will re'-;uire a lot of
human and material resources. It will also require a
professional military knowledge and a higher skill to
operate the sophisticated military equipment. Most
people will have to participate m direct and indi-
rect military activity. Therefore we have to mobilize
not only our internal economic and defense industrial
resources but also organize human resources well. We
have sufficient human resources but have insufficient
material resourses. In view of the characteristics of
future conflict and military environments, we can say
that one of the most important factors is more effec-
tive and efficient management of our resources.
2. In a broad sense. War is a combination of military
political. economic, and geographic situations and
considerations. Here again we can find a variable
blend of abstract terms, each of which is subject to
a variety of meanings and descriptions, as well as
to a variety of subdivisions; for example, geographic
situations and considerations can include climate and
weather; political considerations can include sociol-
ogical aspects. However. military and economic
considerations are related by logistics, since it is
the military element in the nation's economy and the
economic element in its military operations.
[Eef. 13: p. 10-11 ]
, ^
3. In order to keep peace in Korean peninsula, we have
been trying to establish the military balance between
North Korea and Republic of Korea. Today, the mili-
tary force of North Korea is superior to that of EOK.
but EOK's economic power is greatly superior to that
of North Korea. The economic power can influence on
military force positively, but it is noted that major
increases in defense spending are not the solution
for all of tiie problems facing the improvement of
military force. Therefore, we must make the best of
military expenditure. Tc establish these objectives,
military logistics must be integrated across the
military complex and the nation's economic elements.
4. The primary function of military forces is to wage
some level of war (armed conf lictf , when called upon.
Therefore, in order to accomplish their primary func-
tion, military forces must always have a capability
to wage some required level of war. In a broad
sense, military capability includes force structure,
force modernization, force readiness and force
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sustainability. Force readiness is the abilit
whole military organization to rapidly mobi
deploy and right. It includes the ability to re
units into the theater, integrate them into the
ation and sustain them as long as necessary [Eef
p. 2]. To improve military capability, mil
logistics provides the technology to mai
required high readiness level and to sustain o












The logic of the statement that • he_ product of the
total logistics system is military capability" can be
reaffirmed by the use of third dimension. 27 This is
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level of combat training required. During war time,
military logistics limits and shapes the strategies
and tactics that can be implemented- through the
amount and type of military capability it provides to













































































































































In creating and sustaining military capability there
is a natural order to the major operations (segments)
of the military logistics system. This sequence is
> I Tactics i
System j
I 1


















Figure 3.2 The Logistics Flow and Major Subsystem-
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shown in Figure 3.2. The Logistics Systems, in its
upper segment entitled "Weapons Oriented Logistics."
It breaks this logistics environment into two major
subsystems, which in total create and sustain mili-
tary capability. System I, which is composed of the
RSD and acquisition operations, provides the poten-
tial for military capability through tae acquisition
of initial resources. ^3 At this point, it must be
stressed that the Acquisition of Resources (including
weapons^ in itself, provides no additional military
capability to the forces. The requirement to
increase overall productivity in resource-constrained
environment has placed emphasis on all aspects of the
system life-cycle. Therefore , military logistics
has assumed a major role comparable to research,
design, production, and system performance during
operational use. The need to address total system
life-cycle cost(in lieu of acquisition cost only) is
evident, and experience has shown that logistic
support is a major contributor to life-cycle cost -
at least on the basis of those costs which are
visible [Ref- 28: p. 5]. System II includes the base
and depot level operations and assimilates those
resources and creates military capability through its
various functional activities^'' and process.
"Personnel Oriented Logistics" is contained in figure
3.2 in recognition of the fact that it is part of the
total logistics system. Although in the last several
decades it has lost much of its visibility to weapons
oriented logistics, it remains an essential ingre-
dient in both the accomplishment of logistics objec-
tive and the primary xunction of military forces
[Eef. 29: p. 151. it is noted that good people can
overcome the defects in logistics system, but even
the best logistics system will not lead to satisfac-
tory results without good people to operate it.
The preceding paragraphs delineate a few items of infor-
mation necessary to understand the role, objective, and
significance of military logistics, and set the concept of
modern military logistics.
In summary, Modern military logistics is in fact the
cornerstone of the military forces in that: {1)It deals with
human and material resources; (2) It is very concerned with
today's military environment; (3) It provides combat forces
with the capability of waging war; C^jlt provides tangible
evidence of military power in deterring a military threat;
28Initial resources include weapons, support equipments,
initial spares, tools, test equipments, technical data and
fuels, etc. [Ref. 29: p. 16].
^Afunctional activities include maintenance, suppl
transportation, procurement and civil engineering [Ref. 2
p. 16 J.
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(5) It limits and shapes the strategies and tactics that can
he i nplemented during the waging of war; (5) its effective-
ness directly impacts the cost and capatility of military
forces: and (7) It must be integrated across the military
complex and nation's economic elements.
In view of these facts, an acceptable definition of
modern military logistics might be: The integrated, artful
and scientific management of those activities and resources
necessary to create and sustain some required level of mili-
tary capability to defeat against any kinds of enemy's
attack. It does provide concisely the rec^uired art, science
and integration of management concept, a general idea of its
parameters and the objective - which it seeks to achieve the
improvement of military forces. Modern military logistics
has come of age. It is time for military logistics to enter
the major segment of military force in order to improve the
EOK's self-reliance.
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IV. INTEGRATED LOGISIICS SOPPOET (ILS)
A. BACKGROUND AND CONCEPT OF IIS
Military concepts and principles have evolved to cover
the necessary relationships between the three military arts
of strategy, tactics, and logistics. These arts are impor-
tant in achieving the basic objective of a military force-
victory. However, James A. Huston indicates that military
snccess often turns out to be less a game of strategy than
one of logistics. He states that the outcomes hinge more on
the logistical factors and implications than upon abstract
gamesmanship. [Ref- 32: p. 8]
Military leadership, with its watch-dog agencies,
require that every effort be made to minimize material and
personnel costs while continuing to procure and maintain
systems and equipment at a high state of readiness. .Maximum
material readiness may best be accomplished by employing the
concept of total IIS. The term "Integrated Logistics
Support" refers to a planning process designed to provide
timely and effective support of systems and individual
equipments. Essential to the understanding of this process
is acceptance of the concept that the cost and adequacy of
logistics support is a matter equal in importance to the
cost and adequacy of the end item itself. [Ref. 33: p. 7]
To someone unfamiliar with the term, integrated logis-
tics support may seem to be an example - one of a number of
noncommunicative phrases that come into and fall out of
vogue without ever being adequately explained fully
understood. But logistics support isn't a meaningless
phrase designed to obfuscate rather than communicate. It
is, as some people might say, viable standardized wordage.
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The ROK Army continually strives to develop and field
materiel that can be adequately supported, to provide the
logistics environment required to farnish the necessary
support, and to minimize operating and support costs.
Properly applied, ILS is a means to achieve these goals.
To provide a background against which integrated logis-
tics support may be clearly defined, one must state the
obvious: Logistics includes many functions and tasks
performed by many organizations. When these organizations
operate independently, the result of their combined efforts
may be chaos rather than effective logistics. The integra-
tion and coordination of these diverse elements of logis-
tics, starting early in the life-cycle of a materiel system,
is the marrow of ILS. [Ref. 34; p. 14]
ILS is basically a management function that provides the
initial planning, funding, and controls which help to
assure that the ultimate consumer (or user) will receive a
system that will not only meet performance requirements, but
one that can be expeditiously and economically supported
throughout its programmed life-cycle. A major ILS objective
is to assure the integration of the various elements of
support (i.e., test and support equipment, spare/repair
parts, etc.). [Ref. 28: p. 13]
The ILS concept has its U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
beginning in systems acquisition efforts of the 1960's and
is concisely defined in U.S. AR 11-8, Principles and
Policies of the Army Logistics System, and it is addressed
in greater detail in AR 700-127, Integrated Logistic
Support, and in DOD Directive 4100.35, Development of
Integrated Logistic Support for Systems/Equipments. These
publications describe ILS as a process through which logis-
tics considerations are integrated into the design effort
and all elements of the logistics support system are
planned, acquired, tested, and deployed. [Ref. 34: p. 15]
It is also described by the Naval Material Command as:
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...a process which identifies, in a systematic and
orderly manner the functions which must be performed in
support of operation and maintenance/ and the resources
needed to accomplish those functions. The process also
requires that nardware and system design be reviewed
with a view toward establishinq hardware desiqn and
configuration which reduces, to the maximum practicable
extent, the logistics burden placed on the operating
forces. [Eef. 33: pp. 7-8]
One might wonder why logistics support need be consid-
ered during a system's design. The reason is that every
decision made during the development of materiel system
affects logistics support. For a example, a particular
decision may mean that operational performance will be
tetter once the system is in use, but at the same time that
decision may mean that the system suffers, more breakdowns
and requires more time and cost to repair. The net result
may thus be reduced readiness and higher support costs.
Consequently designers must be constantly aware of the
impact of their decisions on logistics support. The ILS
concept provides for this awareness, requiring logistics
support planning to be conducted in concert with system
design.
ILS also promotes adequate consideration of the func-
tional organizations responsible for personnel, training,
test and support equipment, maintenance shop facilities,
operating and maintenance publications, repair parts and
components, and transportation and handling. This insures
the coordination of these aspects to provide a complete
support package. [Ref. 34; p. 15]
During the conceptual and validation phases of materiel
system development, an effective ILS program influences the
design of the system by identifying all pertinent support
considerations. What logistics constraints - such as crit-
ical maintainability parameters and life-cycle support costs
- are involved? What logistics problems or equipment defi-
ciencies are present in similar fielded systems? What
&U
potential transportation problems exist? '/ihat special
repair parts will be needed to maintain the system? What
manuals will have to be published and circulated? Will
special tools be required to repair the system? I-;hat test
equipment will be needed to test the system? And what about
training for maintenance personnel? These and other factors
that impact on operational readiiiess, training, personnel,
and cost must all be identified, along with possible alter-
natives to these elements of the overall support system.
[Ref. 34: p. 16]
How can ILS contribute moie to resolve some of those
logistic problems; and why is the total concept of ILS not
employed to satisfy the need so as to increase operability
and enhance readiness? With the challenges and demands
facing the manager, common sense is no longer an adequate
guide to overcome the barrier. In these difficult times,
one must reflect upon what is being done and how well the
logistics support systems and equipments are being
maintained. ILS by no means provides answers to all the
difficult questions and logistic tasks, but it can serve to
identify problems and to provide alternative ways to manage
the systems and equipments, thereby enhancing readiness.
[Ref. 33: p. 9]
Therefore, ILS is described as a composite of all the
support considerations necessary to assure the effective and
economical support of a system or equipment at all levels of
maintenance for its programmed life cycle. ^o It is an inte-
gral part of system and equipment acquisition and operation
and includes the integration of logistics considerations and
logistics planning into the engineering and design process
of systems, equipment, and modification program. [Ref- 35:
p. 3]
3 ODOD Directive 4100.35 Development of ILS for
Systems/Equipments, p. 2, 1 October 1970.
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In the next section/ nine elements of ILS will be
explained in more detail.
B. ILS ELEHENTS
To understand ILS, one must first understand the
elements that ILS comprises. The principle elements of the
ILS related to the system life cycle include: 3i
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contents of this section come from [Bef. 36]
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3 . Test and Support Equipment
The principal consideration involved in the support
and test equipment planning is to ensure that the operating
forces are provided with all the essential support and test
ecuipment required to perform both schedules ana unscheduled
maintenance actions. Support and test equipment consists of
tools, metrology and calibration equipment, monitoring and
checkout equipment, maintenance stands and special mainte-
nance or handling devices. The identification of require-
ments, design development and evaluation of this type
equipment must be accomplished concurrently with the design
and aevelopment of the prime system. [Eef. 36: p. 28]
^ • Tr ans2or ta ti on and Handling
This element includes identification of the actions
and requirements necessary to ensure the capability to
transport, preserve. package. and handle the prime system
and all its associated and related support materiel. The
transportation and handling planning effort is directed
toward determining a cost-effective system for handling,
packaging, transporting and distributing the prime system
and its related support materiel. The transportation and
handling plan provides for continual management and evalua-
tion of the transportation and handling considerations
throughout the life-cycle of the weapon system.
5 . Personnel and Tr aininq
The personnel and training element is concerned with
the quantitative and qualitative determination of numbers.
skill- levels, training, and assignment of all personnel
required for the operation, maintenance, and support of. the
system or equipment under development. Initial planning
efforts include an analysis of existing personnel manning
capabilities and an evaluation of probable personnel
requirements. The availability of personnel resources
serves as a constraint upon the design and support deci-
sions. The personnel and training plan identifies personnel
manning and training requirements, and the training
resources needed for test and demonstration, and operation
and maintenance of the weapon system. [ Ref- 36: p, 30]
Authors would like to emphasize the importance of manpower
aspects, and then more details of this part appears in the
following section.
6 . lacili ti es
The facilities plan defines the types of facilities
needed to support the weapon system involved. Facilities
include maintenance and supply facilities as well as those
used for training. The plan also defines facilities loca-
tion, space neeas, environment, duration and frequency of
use, maintenance and utility requirements, and development
schedule. Because of the long lead-time involved in the
government approval of military construction funds, the
funding requirements for facility construction/modification
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should be accomplished as early as possible after system
requirements are well defined. racilities planning is based
on operational and maintenance analyses, equipment design
drawings, specifications, and other documentations.
[Ref. 36: p. 29]
7 • Technical Da ta
The purpose of the technical data effort is to
provide timely development of the data involved in all
aspects of system operation and logistic support, i.e.,
operations, maintenance, supply, training, modification,
repair and overhaul. It includes drawings, specifications,
provisioning documentations, operating and maintenance cards
and manuals, computer programs, and inspection, test, and
calibration procedures. The technical data plan must
contain provisions to insure that timely and appropriate
data calls are made and provided for decision-making
purposes.
8 . logistic Support Manage men t Information
The element is concerned with the type and ^^uality
of information required, establishing information flow,
providing collection, analysis and control techniques, ana
aeterminmg hardware management information support require-
ments. This facet of support refers to all computer
programs, condition monitoring and diagnostic tapes, and so
on, necessary in the performance of system maintenance
functions. [Eef. 28: p. 13]
9 . logistic Su££ort Res our ce F unding_
Budgeting and financing activities are primary to
successful logistic support. Budgeting and financing activ-
ities include the identification of support cost factors by
type and year and justifying these costs against budgetary
requirements. Additionally, this element is concerned with
providing accurate estimates of short and long range costs
of the weapon system. That is, to provide total cost
breakout by element with source of funding. In most cases
this will involve Life-Cycle Co£t(LCC) analysis [Ref. 36: p.
31] which will be studied further in tne following chapter.
In summary, for large-scale systems the logistic
support requirements throughout the life cycle are
significant. The prime mission-oriented segment of the
system must be designed with support in mind, and the
various elements of logistic support must be designed to be
compatible with the prime mission equipment. Further, these
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different elements of logistic supi^ort interact with each
other and the efforts of these interactions must be reviewed
and evaluated continually. A major decision or a change
involving any one of these elements could significantly
affect other elements and the system as a whole.
On the other hand, the logistics rec^uirements for
relatively small systems may entail only the functions of
product distribution for the user and initial system instal-
lation and checkout, while the sustaining life-cycle mainte-
nance support will be minimal. In this instance, the
emphasis on logistic support and the design for support-
atility will not be as great as for large systems. The
specific support requirements must be tailored accordingly.
[Ref. 28: p. 13]
C. APPLYING ILS AND IIS PLANNING
Integrated logistics support is a widely misunderstood
system life-cycle discipline. Yet ILS directly affects many
important aspects of system acquisition, including such
coQsiderations as the control of program costs, full funding
for priority programs, and cost versus quantity balance.
The effect of ILS is most pronounced on testing and
decision-making, and its application becomes more critical
as system complexity increases.
'^
• Application of the ILS Concept
ILS provides the framework for the planning and
execution of equipment development and acquisition to assure
supportability and optimum life-cycle cost. To be effective
it must be applied very early in the development phase,
normally during concept formulation, to evaluate the general
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support requirements that could result from various design
alternatives. These support requirements have a far-
reaching effect on the life-cycle cost of a system since the
cost of operation and maintenance in a 10-year period
exceeds the acquisition cost many times over. As a conse-
quence of inflation and the tendency toward increased equip-
ment capability and sophistication, these costs accrue at a
great rate each year. Without adequate control, these costs
can erode the fiscal ability to develop and produce military
materiel. [Eef. 37: p. 34]
When the materiel system enters the full-scale
development phase, the emphasis of the ILS program centers
on detailing support resource requirements, finalizing
support concepts, and validating these requirements and
concepts. Alternatives to the various elements of the
support system must be analyzed and evaluated. And the
supportatility of the materiel system must be demonstrated
to insure that the system meets Army supportability
requirements.
During the production and deployment phase of the
materiel system's development, the validated support system
elements, including such items as maintenance manuals,
tools, and repair parts, are acquired and deployed.
After deployment, equipment performance, mainte-
nance, and cost data are collected, evaluated, and used for
current maintenance management procedures. These data are
also retained for use in product improvement and in future
development programs.
The objectives of this ILS process are to insure
that users receive a system that performs well, to insure
that the system is adequately supported, and to reduce the
cost of ownership of the system throughout its life cycle.
The ILS process serves these objectives by influencing the
design and acquisition of materiel systems - to insure that
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they are reliable and maintaina tie - and by timely planning,
developinent, acquisition, testing, and daployment of
required logistics resources as an integral part of the
materiel acquisition process. Properly applied, ILS can
improve system performance and availability, and it can
minimize schedule delays and cost overruns by planning
support actions rather than reactions. [Ref. 34: p. 16]
Integrated logistics support doesn't end with
concept formulation. It becomes more ubiquitous as an item
proceeds through its development phase and production. A
smooth transition to the initial deployment of a system is a
direct result of ILS planning and implementation. Lower
system operational and maintenance costs in the field are
related to the competence and dedication of maintenance
engineers and specialists involved in a system's
development. In brief, the deployment of a supportable
system with a low life-cycle cost is not a stroke of luck.
It is the result of an arduous process that must be system-
atically pursued throughout the acquisition phase.
[Ref. 37: p. 16]
2 • IIS Planning
The reliance on sophisticated equipment rather than
on sheer manpower in future comtat situations emphasizes the
necessity for good logistics planning and places real impor-
tance on the integration of logistics consideration in the
design process. 32
Prior to the advent of ILS, operational performance
was the only meaningful design parameter for new systems. and
equipment. Success of newly fielded systems was based on
32Lecture Conference, "Introduction to Integrated
Logistic Support," Army Logistic Management Center, Ft. Lee,
Virginia.
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pure performaQce characteristics, such as range, speed, and
payload. Logistic support was provided as an afterthought
or after the design was so far along that significant
changes could not be made. The need for superior equipment
is valid both today and for the foreseeable future; however,
suboptimization of operational performance has been accom-
plished unwittingly at the expense of logistics support.
In the mid 1960*s the enphasis on suboptimization of
operational performance was recognized and there was a turn-
around in logistic support philosophy. Factors contributing
to this turnaround in thought were:
1. Operating cost exceeded acquisition cost.
2. Unacceptable availability rates of major systems.
3. Excessive maintenance repair time.
4. Inability of the standard system to provide adequate
support. [Ref. 38: p. 22]
The purpose of the ILS program is to improve opera-
tional readiness and logistic support management while mini-
mizing operating and support costs. The irony of this
paradox is that the expressed purpose is achievable. The
key continuing objectives for achieving this purpose are:
1. Integration of logistic considerations into the
design.
2. Timely availability of all required logistic
resources. [ Eef . 38: p. 22]
So far, this thesis is going to explain U.S. the
Army's Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP)^^ to illus-
trate the ILS Planning process. It describes the general
concepts and strategy supported by a tentative milestone
schedule. As the ILS program enters the Full-Scale
Development phase, the milestone schedule and updated task
requirements become more specific. The ILSP is inherently
33ILS Plan described in this thesis is based on AR
700-127.
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dynamic, yet it must be flexible enough to ensure the best
overall balance among operational support elements. Figure
4.1 illustrates the ILSP outline. [Ref, 38: p. 22]




PART II : CONCEPTS AND STRATEGY
1. Operational and Organizational
(083) concept
2. Acquisition Strategy
3. Logistics Support Analysis (LSA)
4. Test and Evaluation Concept
5. ILS Elements
6. Logistic Support Resource Funds
PART III : ILS MILESTONE SCHEDULE
Figure 4-1 Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP).
The ILSP is divided into three basic parts:
Part I: General
This part addresses the system description, program
management, and applicable documents.
1. System Description. - A brief description of the
system and Its e^^uipment, purpose, and general
performance characteristics. For example, for a
40-ton Crane Crawler-Mounted, the description would
include details such as: diesel engine driven, full
revolving (36 degree) superstructure, and a basic
boom 50 reet in length. The purj-ose would explain
its intended use, general performance characteris-
tics, and the sysrem^^s unique features.
2. Program Management. - Identification of all partici-
pating organiza'Eions and the level of program review,
participating organizations would constitute the
appropriate project product manager, development
command, and readiness command. The level of review
for manor systems would require either a Defense
System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) or Army
System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) , while
non-major systems would be limited to a local
in-process review (IPR) .
A££lic;able Docaments. - A listing of documents which
rovide guidance or criteria for the functions
escribed in the ILSP. Some examples of the types ofS
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documents referenced are: Army Regulations,
Department of the Army Pamphlets, ililitary Standards-
Justification for. Major System New Starts, and
Required Operational Capability. [ Ref . 38: p, 23]
Part II : Concepts and Strategy
This part is the focal point of the ILSP. It
describes the basic concepts and the strategy for their
achievement; in addition, it defines each of the ILS
elements.
I* QEeration and Organization (O&O) Concept. - This
concept is expressed in lerms of mission scenario,
work environment, deployment plan. and support force
structure. Examples of some of the concept concerns
are: mission scenario - annual operating days and
duration; work environment - ambient temperature;
deployment plan - basis of issue; and support force
structure - skill levels of support personnel.
2. Acquisition Strategy. - This subsection briefly
nescriHes "fhe acquisition approach and relates the
total acquisition strategy to the ILS
3. Logistic Support Analysis (LSA> . - LSA is reguired in
aXX raareriel acquisition programs. By regulation
there are no exceptions. LSA is, however simple, an
analysis that results in a decision on the scope and
level of manpower and logistic support. ^^ This
subsection describes the LSA program in terms of LSA
tasks, structure of LSA records, and contractor
Government relationship.
Test and Evaluation Ccnce2t. - This subsection
Briefly descriBes specific test reguiremehts
directly; for example, reliability and maintain-
ability, support personnel and skill requirements,
training requirements, special tools and equipment,
and adequacy of publications.
Logistic Support Resoarce Funds. - This element iden-
^oTfies IL^ reTatea'TiTe-cycIe funding r eguiremen ts
,
both funded and unfunded, by ILS element, major func-
tion, and appropriation. Cost estimating and
accounting procedures must also be identified to
assure that costing data will be translatable to the
overall system and work breakdown structure
reporting. Travel cost estimates for ILS coordina-
tion and management meetings should be treated as a
separate element of cost. Justification should also
be included for excessive cost and the effect of
unfunded shortfalls. [Ref. 38: pp. 23-25]
3*AR 700-127, "Logistics - Integrated Logistic Support,
1 April 1981.
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Part III : Milestone Schedule
This schedule shows the logical event-oriented
sequencing for specific ILS tasks and events. The dates
assigned are coordinated by the ILS manager for overall
system planning to ensure integration into the materiel
acquisition process. This schedule then becomes the base-
line for logistic considerations and planning in the
materiel acquisition process.
Finally, the concepts, procedures, and processes of
ILS planning are not a panacea for all the problems associ-
ated with the acquisition and support of new sophisticated
equipment. However, they do provide a system for the inte-
gration of logistic consideration into the design and the
assurance of timely availability of all required logistic
resources. [Eef. 38: p, 25]
D. TRAINING THE MANPOWER OF ILS
The purpose of this section is to review and evaluate
manpower aspects of ILS planning. Jlanpower is the number of
personnel authorized or allocated to a unit or agency within
the Army. Hence, it is implicit within "Personnel and
Training"^ one of the nine elements of ILS. Also manpower
is the prerequisite for personnel procurement, distribution
and training necessary to support a system acquisition.
The importance of a review of this particular ILS
element is stressed by the fact that manpower workload
unbalance such as shortage or untrained personnel can make
continual problems in the maintenance of customer equipment
and combat readiness.
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Blanchard^s states that logistic support management
involves the planning, organization, lirection, ana control
of all functions and activities relating to ILS. Most
authors acknowledge that the form of management may vary
from program to program, but none will concede the leader-
ship that is needed to assure that ILS provides the effi-
cient and economical system support required. According to
Blanchard, the ILS manager should be high enough in the
organization to provide effective leadership. [Ref. 32; p.
133]
From the time the raw recruit begins basic training
until he leaves the Army, he is told to be "a soldier first,
a technician second." What's good for the enlisted man is
even more appropriate for officers: To rephrase the maxim,
they should be leaders first and logisticians second.
During peacetime it is particularly easy to lose
'Sight cf the primary mission of the R.C.K. Army, that of
defending our country from all threats, both foreign and
domestic. This mission is applicable to all branches,
logistical as well as tactical. We too often get caught up
in our specialties - supply officer, transportation officer,
food service officer - and forget that our primary concern
should be to train our people to be sharp ground combat
soldiers. Several years of peacetime training have allowed
us to refine our doctrine and sharpen our management skills.
But, in the process, have we neglected our leadership
responsibilities?
Indeed, training and motivating the troops should be
our primary mission- That has always been the primary
mission of the Armed Forces. Be need to recommit ourselves
to this mission of leadership and we must train those under
35The author of "Logistics Engineering and Management"
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us to be equally effective leaders. Soldiers are more moti-
vated by dedicated leadership than by sophisticated manage-
ment technioues or monetary ccmpensation . Thus, a good
leader will produce a good unit, one that produces good
logistics support. The fiber of today's Army can be
improved by being a good leaaer as well as a good
logistician. [Ref. 39; p. 36]
Good things are happening across the whole field of
logistics. Clearly, the Army's top iogisticians are trying
for a balanced program that best provides combat readiness.
As we move deeper into the 1980's, we enter an extraordinary
period of transition, embracing thousands of changes that
are a part of reorganizing, reeguipping, repositioning, and
restationing. These ever-shifting priorities will be
governed, one hopes, by an overall logistics plan that has
as its basis a few verities. Lieutenant General John E.
Galvin36 suggests these:
1. Logisticians must be tacticians and tacticians must
be logisticians.
2. Logistics management must catch up with technology.
3. Logistics training needs emphasis.
4. Logistics schools must coordinate more closely with
field units.
5. Logistics must be simplified.
With our exploding world of technology, it is even
more necessary today for the tactician to be a logistician:
He who carries the modern saber must also carry a wrench.
The equation works the other way, too: The logistician must
be a tactician with a keen ability to sense the flow of the
battle. [Eef. 40: p. 2]
36U.S. VII Corps Commander
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2 . liow to succeed in Logistics
"What should I do to be competitive in my military
career?" Young and energetic Army officer logisticians are
concerned about the kinds of things they should do to
improve their competitive edge in vying for career develop-
ment opportunities. Considerable thoughts are given to all
logisticians who have pondered that question by Lieutenant
General Eichard H. Thompson. ^
7
First/ logisticians need to understand the Army, not
only its missions and functions but also its values and
beliefs. Regardless of current position or experience there
are going to be occasions when their seniors will be
perplexed, or even dismayed, by some of your attitudes.
There is, indeed, a generation gap; but there are also core
values and beliefs that they can jointly embrace and build a
lifetime of service around. Thompson states there are three
beliefs that can be universally shared:
1- Zh^ A£1I is a Erofession. - It is a profession that
requires 3eJicaTion, sacrifice., and commitment.
Service to our country, in the highest and finest
sense, is the principal reward.
2. The Army is geo^le. - The Army is not an impersonal
assemETy of sopTTisticated weapons_ of destruction
linked by high speed electronics. i.t is people, and
people - comrades, family, friends, and countrymen -
are whom the soldier is willing to die for.
3. The Aray is opportunity. - The Army. as perhaps no
o'ZTier institution, oTlers the opporrunity to serve,
develop, grow, share, and contribute. [Ref. 41: p.
8 ]
He also says there are some fundamental values that
can be mutually shared. Among those values are: Honesty
and Integrity, Dedic ation, Pride, Enthusiasm and Optimism,
and Respect.
3"^He was Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, U.S.
Department of the Army.
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After recognizing these fundamental values and
ieliefs, somethings that a ycung logisticians can do in
charting his career to maximize his contributions and to
achieve his potential are suggested as:
1. Go after the tough jobs. Contrary to popular belief
it can be beneficial to volunteer.
2. Stay physically and emotionally fit with a healthy
appetite for work and a positive attitude toward
mission accomplishment.
3. Serve with troops as early and as often as possible.
4. Learn to praise openly, counsel wisely and honestly.
and chastise privately, impersonally, and without
emotion.
5. Don't work toward efficiency reports and scores; give
each job your best and the reports and scores will
take care of themselves.
6. Learn to speak and to write expressively, understand-
ably, and concisely.
-" 7. Be active guided by technical knowledge, logical
though, and common sense.
8. understand and learn from your mistakes.
9. Study war and understand it - it's your profession.
10. Care for your soldiers - help, nurture, and defend
them; for they will be what they think they are and
what you think they are.
Eemember, logisticians are important members of the
Army team. There is a bright future for you on that team.
Attune yourself to become a more vital part of that team,
drawing upon the emerging regeneration of Republic of
Korea's defensive strength. [Eef. 41: p. 9]
3 . Traini ng. ii29.i§i:i2i§.lis
a. The Role of Logistics in Combat Readiness
The four basic challenges to the Army will be
the battlefield, leaxiership, readiness, and training.
Forward deployed forces may have to fight on a few hours'
notice and other components of the force may have only days
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or weeks to make final preparations for war. Therefore,
comnianders must have effective plans for those important
days or weeks, and they must train for the specific missions
they anticipate.
Dnit readiness cannot be a reality without
logistical readiness - the availability and proper func-
tioning of materiel, resources, and systems to maintain and
sustain operations on a fluid, destructive, and resource-
hungry battlefield. The training of support units should be
rigorously trained under conditions similar to those antici-
pated in combat. [Ref. 42: pp. 1.1-1.4]
The readiness of our Army to fight and win is
the most critical issue we face and will require our concen-
trated support. Logistics support of readiness must be
viewed as a double-edged sword, one with a human edge and a
materiel edge. On the human side, we must have adequate,
properly trained combat service support personnel to meet
the challenges of an increasingly sophisticated fighting
machine. These personnel must have the proper tools - that
is, adequate parts, facilities, and the technical assistance
to maintain our expanding inventory of weapon and support
systems. There is an additional challenge to optimize the
mix of active and reserved comhat service support capability
to maximize potential for sustaining the current and
programed force. [Ref- 43: p. 2]
i. Training Logistics Units
Soldiers must be prepared for combat both
professionally and psychologically. Training is the corner-
stone of success and a full-time job for all commanders in
peacetime, and it continues in wartime combat zones regard-
less of other operations or missions. [Ref- 42: p. 1-4]
80
How well is my unit trained for combat? This
simple question with its far-reaching ioplications causes
sweaty palms and sleepless nights for too many field
commanders. The consequences of poor training are enormous.
Training is, and always will he, the single most important
mission any commander undertakes. The emphasis a commander
gives training has a direct relationship to the quality of
all command programs. Without good training, the commander
will sooner or later fail.
Why/ then, does the combat service support
training mission seem so complex and difficult to
accomplish? Simply stated, logistics unit require both
tactical and technical training. That in itself is a tough
task, but add a garrison logistics support mission and you
get triple trouble. The approach to tactical and technical
training requires a carefully planned, systematic program.
Fortunately, a significant part of the technical training
can occur more or less automatically because many combat
service support units provide the same, or similar, services
in garrison that they do in the field. If properly planned
and implemented, garrison missions can complement field
missions and strengthen the technical training base. This
certainly is no panacea because every soldier cannot be
productively in an MOS-related job while in garrison.
However, opportunities are often available for rotation into
MOS-related training positions. [Ref. 44: p. 16]
Therefore, commander has to consider following
commonsense suggestions to reach at the training level of
his unit successfully:
1. Orient soldiers to their rol^e on the battlefield.
2. Review (or teach if necessary) and train in basic
infantry skills.
3. Train for the field while in garrison.
4. Reinforce basic skills with "hardnosed" training.
5. Conduct tactical field training exercises.
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6. Combine the tactical and technical.
7. Inteyrate tactical training with combat arms units.
8. Conduct a review and analysis of combat capabilities,
roles, and functions.
9. Begin and end training with a good, commonsense plan.
There are no shortcuts to good training. It is
a hard, never-ending task that must be accomplished over and
over again. It can be fun and exciting provided soldiers
see the purpose and are led by competent, well-trained
leaders. As commanders, we are responsible for successful
training. We must it happen. [Hef. 44; p. 18]
c. Precommand Courses for Logisticians
Formal training includes in ILS terms both
initial training for system/product familiarization and
£§£l§Ili:Shment training to cover attrition and replacement
personnel. Training is designed to upgrade assigned
personnel to the skill levels defined for the system.
[Ref, 28: p. 12]
Major changes in officer education will insure
that tomorrow's regiment and battalion commanders are
prepared to meet the logistics challenges and demands of
future war.
This thesis will suggest following the example
set by the U.S. Training and Eoctrine Command (TEADOC) in
its implementation of combat arms and combat support precom-
mand courses, the Army Logistics Center, and developed a
four-phase combat service support precommand course for
lieutenant colonel and colonel command designees. It encom-
passes home study, resident study at either the Logistics
Center or one of the four combat service support schools
(the Missile and Munitions School, the Transportation




resident study at the Commdnd and General Staff College.
[Ref. 45: p. 9]
This proposed example can be compared with
E.D.K. Army training system for logisticians in Logistics
School, just established, or each of combat service support
schools, and will suggest one of sample model to study and
develop our system efficiently.
The logistics cominand designee will complete
four phases of precommand training before going to his new
command assignment; these phases are as follows:
5ii§§^ i* Home Studx-
Bexore an individual attends one of the logis-
tics precommand classes (phase 11)/ he must first complete a
self-paced, home-study phase. A home-study packet is mailed
to each command designee 3 months before he is scheduled to
attend phase II classes. Depending on which of the phase II
classes the Military Personnel Clenter projects for the
officer, he receives correspondence course material for one
of three Logistics Center home-study tracks - for those
projected to become DISCOH commanders; for those projected
to become COSCOM commanders; or for those projected to
become support battalion commanders. Additionally, each of
the four associated logistics schools sends a singular
function-oriented home-studv package to its designees.
The home-study phase requires about 15 hours for
completion. It includes an update on Field Manuals, writ-
ings by former battalion commanders, and a handbook for
future battalion commanders. There is also an optional
diagnostic test covering both tactics and logistics, with an
accompanying study guide. Those choosing to complete the
diagnostic exercises may mail them to the Logistics Center
or one of the associated schools, where they will be graded
and returned along with an explanation of the correct
answers. Test results will be evaluated and areas recom-
mended in which the command designee may need additional
review before attending the resident phases. [Ref- 45: p.
10]
Eli§§§ 11 • Logistics Precommand Classes.
During pTiase IT, IITe logistics officer will
attend a 2-week course at either the Logistics Center or one
of the four combat service support schools. Individuals who
are destined to command units with several logistics
requirements - maintenance, supply, transportation, ammuni-
tion, and quartermaster - will attend the course conducted
at tne Logistics Center. These "multifunctional" command
designees are further divided into five different tracks,
depending on whether their future assignment will be with a
corps support command, division support command, support
group, area support group, or support battalion-
Organizational logistics is stressed during the
first week in all combat service support precommand courses.
The second week focuses on training management and course
content reflects the job-task surveys conducted by the
service schools in coordination with TEADOC. Critical
subjects for each type of command designee are determined
from the respective service schools' job-task analysis.
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Many of the course instructors have recent, branch-specific
field experience. Performance-oriented training management
instruction is supplemented by discussions with former
company commanders and tours of "motor pools, supply rooms,
and arms rooms. [Ref. 45: p. 10]
Phases III and IV: Precqmmand Training at Command and
^ieral S^aff College
Cpon completion of the 2-week logistics precom-
mand class, the officer joins a class of other command
selectees from the combat arms and the combat support
schools. There , he is given an additional week of command
development instruction and a week of "how-to-fight" prac-
tical exercises.
The command orientation of the third phase
provides new field commanders with insight into the human
elements of command - management of human resources, organi-
zational effectiveness, drug and alconol abuse, women in the
Army^ and chaplain functions. Among the other topics
considered during this phase are tactical battlefield logis-
tics and the computer-assisted tactical training system,
logistics wargaming which is introduced in the next section.
The final phase of the precommand course, phase
IV, is better known as the "how-to-fight" phase. It helps
command designees apply the skills learned or reviewed
during their home-study, their 2 weeks at the Logistics
Center or one of its associated schools, and their first
week Command and General Staff College. A combination of
tactics and logistics exercises is designed to reinforce the
functional skills and reacguaint future commanders with
management and leadership problems normally found in the
type of unit they will command. Students will be given
problems that require them to apply principles of leadership
and management as well as a knowledge of their functional
area.
After completing the four phases of the logis-
tics precommand course, new commanders are better prepared
to play their important role in insuring the survival and
ultimate success of our military forces. The emphasis of
the precommand program for logistics clearly is that of
supporting the Army in the field. [Ref. 45: p. 11]
4 . Introduction of Logistics i^argam in^ Mojis 1
In this section, the 'ATLAS* model which is used in
the US Army is introduced briefly for development of Korean
Army's logistics wargaming. Wargaming was first introduced
as a means of helping combat arms commanders develop and
practice battlefield strategy. It wasn't until much later
that wargaming included logistics considerations, however.
Until recently, logistics gaming was limited to division-,
corps-, theater-, or Army-level games. [Ref. 46; p. 36]
The 1973 Middle East War made people see that
tactical wargaming unquestionably lacked realistic logistics
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coQsiderations . The War also showed that logistics would
play a decisive role on the modern battlefield. The Army
that can keep its weapon systems operating will more than
likely be the winner. Since the 1973 War, emphasis has been
placed on integrating logistics aspects into wargaming,
including realistic logistics planning and support.
One result of the shift in emphasis was the develop-
ment of the maintenance management exercise called 'ATLAS'.
Developed by the Ordnance Center and School, ATLAS allows
battalion logistics managers to make realistic maintenance
and supply decisions. Because it is a free-play manual
wargame, it can be tailored to fit the training needs of any
maintenance battalion.
As usually played, ATLAS calls for participation of
the battalion commander, his primary staff, the materiel
officer, and the company shop officer. Decisionmakers at
each level, from the company shop officer up to the
battalion commander, make decisions based on the tactical
situation, current priorities, and the availability of
resources. The results of these decisions become readily
apparent as the game progresses. [ Ref . 46: p. 36]
The method of play is designed to simulate the
normal activities of a maintenance battalion. The game is
based on the management of 40 major end items. Since this
is approximately half the normal supported density, each
soldier can be worked for only half the normal hours of
every game day.
The game begins with backlogged shops as indicated
in the maintenance control system reports issued to the
materiel office and each shop office. These reports show
the open work request register, the deadline detail listing,
the battalion workload status, and workload summary listing.
Each shop officer is provided with a preloaded tub file of
jobs, a tag for each soldier by grade and MOS, a shop stock
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preloaded to 90 percent fill, and a tag for each organic
vehicle. Game time is compressed so that each played game
hoar represents 15 minutes of real time.
As the first game day begins, the shop officer
assigns personnel (represented ty the tags) to customer jobs
either in shop or awaiting shop. Simulated forms cut down
on the time required to complete paperwork necessary for
control at the company and battalion level. Work requests
are represented by computer cards listing the item of equip-
ment, its fault, the part required, and the man-hours neces-
sary for repair.
Each game day starts with the rolling of a die to
determine maintenance requirements and equipment combat
losses. The same procedure is followed for personnel
losses. To add realism, recovery of mired or damaged equip-
ment is also played. The shof officer, using computation
tables designed for that purpose, computes travel time,
hookup time, extraction time, unhooking time, and return
time on any recovery mission. There is also an operational
readiness float available for play if the battalion
commander so desires. The commander can modify the game to
emphasize any maintenance area he feels is important for his
unit. [Ref. 46: p. 38]
The tactical scenario, which is provided along with
maps and overlays showing the location of all friendly
units, indicates the enemy has attacked and is
regrouping, while the friendly forces are maximizing efforts
to repair and return as much equipment as possible to the
combat units. With this in mind, each shop officer uses his
soldiers, equipment, and time to return equipment required
by his customers quickly. But, no matter how hard the shops




Critical parts are required and decisions must be
made. One such decision might be whether to expend the
man-hours to go to a cannibalization point or to repair some
other piece of equipment for which the parts are already on
hand. The battalion commander and the materiel officer must
establish priorities for equipment repair, moving personnel
from one unit to another and equalizing workloads. The
supply officer must decide when and where to cross- level
partS/ keep track of cannibalized parts available, expedite
high priority requests, and keep the materiel officer
informed of the status of critical repair parts.
ATLAS is a training-oriented game, the results of
which are not normally given tc higher command levels. It
was designed to be an internal training device that tests
the existing operating procedures within the battalion with
emphasis on rapid, factually based decisionmaking.
Since ATLAS is designed to teach more effective
decisionmaking, it isn't a graded exercise. The results of
the game are provided solely to the players involved and
become a method of internal evaluation of standard operating
procedures, effective coordination, and efficient utiliza-
tion of personnel, equipment repair parts, and time.
[Ref. 46: p. 38]
E. IIS - PREREQUISITE FOR IMPROVED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
At no time in the history of our country has the need
for improved logistics support of Korean Army been more
critical than it is today. National Security, in a peace
time era, really suffers because the longer the people enjoy
the peacetime, the less motivated they are to 'keep their
guard up' against any hostile acts. [Ref. U7: p. 10]
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1 . Teamwork in Readiness
Success on the modern battlefield will depend upon
two things: the well-trained individual soldier and the
proper functioning of his equipment. Effective training and
actual comLat both require maximum operational equipment.
Anything done to improve equipment readiness rates and make
more equipment available for training will improve a unit's
chances of SMCcess on the battlefield.
Although the responsibility for operational readi-
ness falls upon the shoulders of the unit commander, he
alone cannot assure that the unit will meet its readiness
goals. Success in readiness, like success in combat,
requires a team effort consisting of the organization and
its direct support unit (DSU). Keeping today's sophisti-
cated equipment functioning with the limited resources
available is no easy task. Equipment readiness is just one
of several problems that beset each unit and each direct
support unit. The priorities and resources of the customer
unit and the direct support unit differ significantly.
The disparity of priorities and resources sometimes
results in animosity among the units. Unit personnel
complain; "We can't get parts," or "The DSU never supports
us." Direct support unit personnel, on the other hand,
complain: "The units don't cooperate," or "They want us to
do their work for them." These complaints are usually more
perceived than real, but they do detract from the team
effort and hurt readiness programs. [Ref. 48: p. 10]
Kost units and their DSU's do what the regulations
require, and often a great deal more, in their efforts to
meet readiness goals. Yet, some units succeed in meeting
their goals more often than others. Why?
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An analysis of the relationship between the aost
successful customer units and DS'J's reveals a common
element. They all stress cooperation and coordination.
They have adopted special procedures or extra efforts to
help the other unit do its job tetter or easier. The proce-
dures are not always required cr supported by Army regula-
tions, yet they do seem to produce higher mission capable
rates. There also seems to be a friendly rapport between
the DSU and its customer units.
How does your unit rate in meeting its readiness
goals? Could a better DSU-customer relationship iielp
improve your readiness rates? Any commander or supervisor
can examine his unit and its DSU-customer relationship by
asking the series of questions that follow. The questions
are not all-inclusive and not all of them will apply to
every unit. Read the questions and consider how your unit
functions as a member of the readiness team. [ Ref . 48; p.
11]
2ii§§i4oil§ £2£ custoaer units:
1. Does the unit commander and the maintenance officer
visit the DSU at least once a month? Do you expect
the DSU to juggle resources and priorities for your
unit without knowing your problems?
2. Are supply issues and completed job orders promptly
picked up from the DSU?
3. Are repairable items packaged correctly and promptly
turned in to the DSU?
U. If there is an urgent need for a specific item of
equipment or if the DSU has an excessive backlog,
does your unit offer to help?
5. When the DSU does an exceptionally good job or
renders special support, do you tangibly acknowledge
it?
6. When equipment is taken to the DSU for turn-in, is it
clean? 'Are all organizational maintenance faults
corrected as completely as possible?
£li§stions for direct su££grt units:
1. Are customers furnished a copy of your standing oper-
ating procedure that clearly and concisely tells how
work orders, supply requests, and turn-ins of
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unserviceables are proc€ssed? Does it explain how
assistance requests are handled and how float items
are issued?
2. Does the DSQ commander, shop officers, and technical
supply officer occasionally visit customer units and
perioaically attend their readiness reviews?
3. Are contact teams provided for some on-site repairs
and for most field exercises?
4. When equipment is inspected for acceptance into DSU
maintenance, does your unit provide tne customer with
the space and tools needed to correct organizational
discrepancies?
5. Does your DSU accept and act on emergency supply and
work requests regardless of the hour of the day or
day of the week?
6. Does your DSU shut down one afternoon a week for
training or internal maintenance?
7. Do the key personnel of your DSU know the readiness
^osture or customer units on a day-to-day basis, or
does your DSU complete job orders and issue parts
strictly on the basis of the age and priority oi the
request?
8. In a real crunch, will your DSU lend tools, test
equipment, and a supervisor to help a unit complete
repairs not specifically authorized on their mainte-
nance allocation chart?
9. Does your DSU routinely check other support units and
canniDalization points to obtain missing parts that
are delaying the completion of job orders?
10. Does your DSU routinely correspond with higher head-
quarters?
The direct support unit and the customer unit are
members of a team whose common goal is to achieve the
highest possible equipment operational readiness rates.
This goal can be achieved only by laying aside unit rival-
ries and local prejudices. There is no room for blaming
other units for poor readiness rates. Excuses such as "It's
not our mission," or "It's not required by regulation," are
really no excuses. The customer unit and the direct support
unit must function as a frictionless team if the Army is to
success in both peace and war. [fief. 48; pp. 11-13]
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2. IIS Management Team (ILSTIT)
The task of developin'j the logistics su^fort
required for a materiel system is similar to that of devel-
oping the materiel system itself and is subject to the same
types of problems. Where the materiel system has many tech-
nical characteristics that have to be ' balanced and inte-
grated, the logistics support system must balance and
integrate such functional elements as supply support;
rationalization, standardization, and interoperability;
packaging^ handling, and storage; maintenance; support
equipment and test, measurement, and support equipment
;
transportation and transportability; computer resource
support; and facilities. In addition, logistics support and
the materiel system design must be integrated. As with the
technical characteristics of the materiel system, no single
logistics element can be pursued independently to the exclu-
sion of all others. [Eef. 49: p. 32]
This thesis explaias US Army's ILSIIT to illustrate a
management tool that has been successfully for several years
in developing life-cycle logistics support during the
materiel acquisition cycle. Army Regulation 700-127,
Integrated Logistics Support, dated 1 April 1981, estab-
lishes the requirement for the team for all major and
designed nonmajor materiel system acquisition as a part of
the overall integrated logistics support function.
Much as the system engineering design review process
is the key to successfully developing materiel, the face-to-
fdce meetings of the ILSHT members representing the various
logistics functional elements serve the same purpose for
developing logistics support. At this meetings, the total
attention and energy of the members can be directed to
resolving current problems and anticipating future ones.
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The ILSMT operates under a formal charter that iden-
tifies and defines the duties cf the team and its members.
The charter should be as specific as possible in describing
what the ILSHT will do to eliminate duplication/ reduce
acquisition and operating costs, improve integration of
support elements, provide a logistics influence on design,
resolve schedule and contract conflicts, reallocate program
funds and priorities, and redirect contractor efforts.
[Ref. 49: p. 32]
Therefore, this thesis proposes that ROK Army head-
quarters as well as Ministry of National Defense has to
organize more effective system such as ILSilT for improved
ILS as soon as possible.
The team is chaired by the integrated logistics
support manager for the materiel acquisition. Participants
come from the functional logistics elements within the
materiel readiness commands such as technical publications,
new equipment training, provisioning, and others.
Junctional elements of the materiel development commands
such as reliability and maintainability or design engi-
neering should also be represented. Membership should be
extended to the Logistics Evaluation Agency, the Materiel
Readiness Support Activity, and the Army Materiel Systems
Analysis Activity. Participation by the Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TEADOC) including the representatives of
it's proponents is considered essential. Other representa-
tives should come from the integrating centers, the
logistics-oriented schools, test organizations, and the
Training Support Center.
Many times ILSMT members participate in other team
or group activities associated with the same materiel acqui-
sition program. For example, cne member may participate in
the test integration working group while another may be a
member of the logistics support analysis review team. This
practice greatly improves the coordination process.
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Participating organizations should designate a
primary and an alternate ILSMT member and should insure that
only the primary or the alternate member attends the
meeting. This eliminates the need to spend time orienting
participants who are not familiar with the acquisition
effort. Additionally, the size of the ILSMT must be rigor-
ously controlled. Even when only the essential ILS consid-
erations are represented, the team can quickly jrow to 15 or
more members. Teams this large or larger become hard to
control and lose much of their group dynamics. [Ref. 4 9: p.
Before the meetings, the ILS manager should deter-
mine the central theme and circulate a message requesting
team members to furnish related agenda items. This gives
the IIS manager control over the meeting while satisfying
the needs of the ILSnT members. After receiving input, the
ILS manager should establish the agenda and furnish it to
participants before the meeting.
Every effort will be made to complete action on all
agenda items at the meeting. If action is not completed or
a problem is not resolved, the ILS manager will designate an
action office to report at the next ILSMT meeting. Minutes
of the meeting should be distributed to participants as
quickly as possible. The publication of minutes keeps
participants informed and documents the ILSMT effort.
The ILSMT offers an excellent tool to accomplish the
many ILS actions required during the materiel acquisition
cycle. Although there is expense involved in exercising
this tool, the resources required to sustain the ILSMT are
more than justified when compared to the expense of fielding
a materiel system that can't be logistically supported.
[Ref. 49: p. 33]
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3 . Some Considerations for Im2I2Z§^ lk§.
a. Industrial Logistics Considerations
Operating a military organization in less-
motivated atmosphere is quite difficult. There is just not
enough budget available to provide for all the needs which
the security experts require, and inflationary pressures
continue to shrink these expenditure. This is also true in
the industrial sector. Those industries which are producing
for military requirements are facing severe difficulties.
They are keenly aware that preservation of the military
oriented industrial base is required as part of the peace-
time security structure. They are also aware of the three
important roles they must play:
1. Continuing research and development of new svstems to
improve our security arsenal and stay ahead of poten-
tial hostile nations.
2. Providing the facilities and production planning base
for manufacture of equipment m support of any mobi-
lization requirement.
3. life-cycle support of equipment already in the mili-
tary inventory as well as improved logistics planning
for future requirements. [Ref. 47: p. 10]
Carrying out these roles in times of tight
budgets is most difficult. Both the military and the indus-
trial base must trim down and do their jobs more
efficiently. To do this, two basic tenets must be adhered
to:
1. The military must concentrate their energies and
resources on the tactical and strategic needs of
national security plan.
2. Industry must devote their facilities and resources
to provide total support of the security plan.
A typical defense related industry provides
three basic functions relating to their product; they design
products, produce products and support products. In doing
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this, the more progressive concerns usually organize along
these specialized functions. The results achieved are
higher quality, lower cost products and more responsive







Development j I Production 1 I Support
Division | j Division | | Division
Figure 4.2 Typical Defense Industry Company Organization.
Within such an organization, products or systems
are usually created from the research in the Development
division. Should pre-producticn or production requirements
emerge, the Production Division would take the lead. Once
the product or system reaches the termination of production,
the Support Division takes over management. Program manage-
ment can reside in any of the three divisions, depending
upon the maturity of the particular product or system. In
any case, all three divisions are a part of the program
team. [Eef. 47: pp. 10-11]
The primary objective of any logistics support
organization must be to satisfy customers. If the products
and services of a logistics industry cannot accomplish this,
it will soon be out of business. Customer satisfaction must
also be backed up by satisfactory profits. More specifi-
cally,
.
a logistics organization should be committed to
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provide total life-cycle support of the systems being sold.
The equipment being supported must be kept operable and it
must be done for a minimum expenditure. Total acquisition
cost and total support cost add up to total cost of
ownership. Minimizing cost of ownership is the objective
that the logistics organization must strive for.
To attain this objective on any program, the
Integrated Logistic Support Program Manager must be chal-
lenged to achieve successful results in complying with two
policies:
1. ILS Policy Ng.1 - The IIS projram manager is respon-
sible for creating, implementing, and continuously
up-dating a total life-cycle support plan for his
program.
2. ILS Policy No-2 - The IIS program manager is respon-
sible for creating, implementing, ana continuously
up-dating a total business or strategic plan for his
program.
Addition of Policy No . 2 is the first uni-^ue
feature of the ILS organization which has total business
management responsibility. This type organization has the
resources and authority to act to achieve total support of a
program without outside assistance. [Ref. 47: p. 11]
There are two additional life-cycle support
considerations which deserve attention. The first is the
idea of establishing and maintaining a spares production
capability for contractor sourced spare parts. These items
are usually unique to the system they are used in. They
also usually require relatively expensive manufacturing
facilities and test equipment. During production build-up,
spares production can be gotten from production lines with
proper planning. On the other hand, during production
phase-out, surplus production tooling required for spares
and repair should be transitioned from the production
facility to the support facility.
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The second life-cycls support consideration
which reduces cost is the concept of combining factory test
requireaents with customer test requirements and giving the
logistics test products organization responsibility for
both. In this new era of reduced spending and more reliance
on contractor support, as well as the increased design-to-
cost emphasis, such a combination is both efficient and cost
effective. Factory test and depot test are both done prima-
rily with commercial equipment, and, thus should be either
identical or quite similar in configuration. Field test
requirements should be minimized through increased use of
built-in-test (BIT). The 'BIT' can also be utilized in both
depot and factory for production and repair checkout.
In summary, the most effective logistics organi-
zation is one which (1) handles the people problems through
its functional organization, (2) handles profit problems
through its product line organization, and (3) handles total
support integration problems through its programs
organization. Doing these three jobs simultaneously is
quite difficult and requires an extensive range and depth of
good management personnel. A good logistics organization is
thus probably heavily endowed with competent management.
The concept will not work, otherwise. [Ref. 47: pp. 11-13]
b. Logistics Research and Development Program
Readiness of the Army is getting the highest
priority in the allocation of resources. Efficiently
managing these resources is presenting defense logisticians
formidable challenges in procuring and fielding the large
numbers of new and sophisticated weapon systems entering
the inventory. Our military systems mast also continue to
be technologically better than those of our potential adver-
saries in order to counter their superiority in numbers.
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Together, these tvvo requirements t^resent a logistics manage-
ment dilemma: how do we maintain the Army's readiness at the
same time we improve its technological edge? And how do we
balance resource requirements to realize both goals?
[F.ef. 50: p. 14]
Dr. Korb38 has described logistics research and
development (R&D) as "the application of technology to
reduce logistics and weapon system requirements for our
forces." Following Dr. Korb's lead, the US Department of
the Army (DA) has further defined logistics research and
development as "the application of science, technology, and
research and development disciplines to anticipate and solve
logistics support systems deficiencies through existing
appropriation channels."
Perhaps to more clearly understand what logis-
tics research and development is, is to say what it is not.
The essential difference between logistics research and
development and existing improvement programs - such as ILS;
reliability, availability, and maintainability; and product
improvement programs - is, quite simply, that logistics KSD
is more generic in nature. This philosophy treats logistics
systems across the board as a separate functional area,
distinct from the support of a specific weapon system, and
thus ensures that improvements in logistics systems and
methods get equal billing with weapon systems development
and paves the way toward logistics support continuity in
supporting the * fluid battle' scenarios of the future.
Logistics research and development efforts can
be categorized into three broad areas - management
processes, logistics systems, and generic technology'
improvements. [ Ref . 50: p. 14]
3 sus Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics.
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Some examples from these areas may further
clarify the differences in traditional research and develop-
ment activities and those anticipated through the logistics
research and development program. Let's examine technical
data management as a logistics ESD effort that also involves
a management process. This project seeks to improve the
management and flow of technical data through automation
from the contractor's plant to the ultimate user - the
soldier in the field (see Figure 4.3). Data emerges from a
contractor's plant and becomes incorporated into engineering
drawing. These are placed into a digital storage and
retrieval system, controlled by a technical data management
system. These data theo flew through the provisioning
master record and logistics support analysis records to
automated publications and, finally, to user electronic
display devices. Technical data automation could, of
course, be addressed as an integrated logistics support
element if it were being addressed only as it applied to a
tank or other weapon system; but when addressed from the
logistics research and development point of view it would
encompass state-of-the-art data automation technology appli-
cable to all weapon systems and logistic support system.
[Ref. 50: pp. 14-15]
All organization levels within the Army need to
become involved as the logistics research and development
program evolves. There needs to be a coordinated effort
among the Army's logistics research and development players.
Figure 4.4 depicts the coordination and information exchange
that is needed throughout the logistics R&D process in QS
Army (Korean Army_ has similar type of organization) .
How will the logistics RSD process be institu-
tionalized within the Army? The combat service support
mission area analysis will serve as the foundation for
building a long-term logistics RSD program. From this
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Figure U.U BSD Coordination/Information Exchange Concept.
mission area, logistics R£-D projects will be generated. In
developing the management framework for logistics RSD, we
must also improve the combat service support mission area
analysis methods. A master plan for the combat service
support mission area under development will serve as a road
map towar-d other potential logistics R&D projects.
Over the long run, the logistics R&D goal must
be "to develop a streamlined logistics structure that
promotes high weapon system availability and rapid, flexible
deployment capability," to quote Dr. Korb.
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Logistics ESD is a tool that can be used to ease
the logistics burden of the soldier by making the combat
service support system work more effectively. Current ESD
methods do not adequately incorporate the input of the read-
iness logistician. This program serves to focus the atten-
tion of the researchers and developers on long-term
readiness needs. In the short run, projects such as tech-
nical data management, ammunition packaging, battlefield
robotic ammunition supply system, and spark the initial
logistics research and development program. [ Ref - 50: p.
16]
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V. IIFE- CYCLE COST MODEL IN ACQUISITION PROCESS
Traditionally, military system had a tend only to empha-
size the quality (effectiveness) and initial acquisition
cost rather than total life-cycle cost [Ref. 51: pp. 39-44],
The ROK Army now has to prepare cost trade-off studies,
operate under rigid change control procedures, comply with
cost and schedule control system criteria, develop
Life-Cycle Cost estimates, conduct risk analysis and track
selected performance parameters, and most recently prepare
to live with Design-to-Cost as a measure of engineering
design effectiveness. For the past couple of years, we have
heen asked to provide ILS for new system acquisition.
Therefore, the logisticians always have to have one eye on
the ongoing program and the other on the future [Ref- 52: p.
15].
A- LOGISTICS IN THE SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
In the military sense, logistics is concerned with the
various aspects of maintenance and system/product support,
particularly from the point in time when systems are in
operational use. Logistics support should Le a major
consideration in the establishment of system requirements,
in the development of design criteria, and in the evaluation
of alternatives leading to the selection of a firm design
configuration. The object is to develop a system that will
fulfill its mission at the lowest overall life-cycle cost,
[fief. 28: pp. 1-2]
Systems and products have become more complex as tech-
nology advances, and logistics requirements have increased
in general. Not only have the costs associated with system/
102
product acquisition increased significantly in the past
decade, but the costs of logistic support have also been
increasing at an alarming rate. At the same time, the
current economic dilemma of decreasing budgets combined with
upward inflationary trends result in less money available
for the acquisition of new systems and/or for the mainte-
nance and support of those items already in use.
In view of these trends, one of the greatest challenges
facing industry, business, government agencies, and the
general consumer of products and services today is the
growing need for more effective and efficient management of
our resources. The requirement to increase overall produc-
tivity in a resource-constrained environment has placed
emphasis on all aspects of the system/product life cycle,
and logistics has assumed a major role comparable to
research, design, production, and system performance during
operational use. The need to address total system life-
cycle cost (in lieu of acquisition cost only) is evident,
and experience has shown that logistic support is a major
contributor to life-cycle cost. Further, experience has
indicated that a great deal of the impact on the projected
life-cycle cost for a given system or product stems from
decisions made during the early phases of advance system
planning and conceptual design. Decisions at this point
have a major impact on activities and operations in all
subsequent phases of the life cycle. Given the 'cause-and-
effect' relationships and the fact that logistics costs may
assume major proportions, it is essential that logistic
support be considered (as a part of the decision- making
process) at the early stages of system/product planning and
design. [Ref. 28: pp. 5-6]
In essence, logistics, which includes the integration of
many activities and elements, has become significant in each
phase of the life cycle- Logistics requirements must be
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initially planned, and subsequently integrated into the
system design process. The ultimate objective is to develop
and produce a system design inc:orporating the necessary
logistic support capability in an effective and efficient
manner.
Logistics in the context of the system life cycle
involves planning, analysis and design, testing, production,
distribution, and the sustaining support of a system (or
product) throughout the consumer "Use Period". With the
advent of new technologies and the increasing complexities
of system today, combined with limited resources and reduced
budgets, it is essential that all facets of a system must be
addressed in each phase of the life cycle and dealt with on
an integrated basis.
The major facets of logistics as related to various
program phases are highlighted as follows:
1. Identification of need (user)
.
2. Advance planning and conceptual design.
3'. Advance development and preliminary system design
(validation)
.
4. Detail design and development (full-scale develop-
ment) .
5. Production and/or construction.
6. System use and life-cycle support (user)
.
7. System retirement- [Eef. 28: pp. 3-8]
The functions involved with the system life cycle are
closely related to logistic support. Figure 5.1 illustrates
the system development process a_nd conveys the major inter-
faces between prime mission equipment and logistics support.
A step-by-step analysis depicted in Figure 5.1 is as:
[Ref, 28: p. 9]
1. Given a specific need, system operational character-
istics, mission profiles, development, utilization,
effectiveness rigures of merit, maintenance
constraints, and environmental requirements are
defined. Effectiveness figures of merit may include
factors for cost effectiveness, availability, depend-
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Figure 5-1 System Life Cycle and Logistics Interfaces
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information, the system maintenance concept is
defined. Operational re^^uirement s and the mainte-
nance concept are the basic determinants of logistic
support resources (Figure 5. ^, blocks 1 and 2) .
Major operational, test, production, and support
functions are identified, and qualitative and quanti-
tative requirements for the system are allocated as
design criteria (or constraints) for significant
indenture levels of the prime equipment as well as
applicable elements of support (i.e.. test and
support equipment, facilities, etc.). Those require-
ments that include logistics factors also form bound-
aries for design (Figure 5.1, blocks 3 and 4).
Fithin the boundaries established by the design
criteria, alternative prime mission e-^uipment and
support configurations are evaluated through trade-
off studies. and a preferred approach is selected.
For each alternative, a preliminary logistic support
analysis is accomplished to determine the anticipated
required resource associated with that alternative.
Through numerous trade study iterations, a chosen
prime mission equipment configuration and support
policy are identified (Figure 5.1, blocks 5 and 5).
The chosen prime mission equipment configuration is
evaluated through a logistic support analysis effort
which leads to a gross identification ox logistics
:pected overall effectiveness and compl:
with the initially specified qualitative and quanti-
tative requirements (i.e., its capability to cost-
effectively satisfy the statement of need) . The
ultimate output leads to the generation of a system
specification (and lower-level specifications) formed
tne basis for detail design (Figure 5.1, blocks 7
through 9)
.
5. During the design process, direct assistance is
provided to design engineering personnel in areas
such as reliability, maintainability, supportability,
and human factors- These tasks include the interpre-
tation of criteria; accomplishment of special
studies; participation in the selection of equipment
and suppliers; accomplishment of predictions (reli-
ability and maintainability) ; participation in
progressive formal and informal design reviews; and
participation in the test and evaluation of engi-
neering models and prototype equipment. An in-depth
logistic support analysis, based on released design
data, results in the identification of specific
support requirements in terms of tools, test and
support eauipment, spare/repair parts, personnel
cuantities'and skills, training requirements, tech-
nical data, facilities, transportation, packaging.
and handling requirements. The logistic support
analysis at this stage provides (a) an assessment of
the prime equipment design for supportability and
potential cost/system effectiveness, and (b) a basis
for the provisioning and acquisition of specific
support items (Figure 5. 1, blocks 10 through 12) .
6. Prime mission equipment items are produced,
constructed, tested, and deployed or phased into
full-scale operational use. Logistic support
elements are acquired, tested, and phased into
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operation on an as-needed basis. Throughout the
operational life cycle of the system, logistics data
are collected to provide (a) an assessment of systera
cost effectiveness and an early identification of
operating or maintenance problems. and (b) a basis
for the reprovisioning ci support items at selected
times daring the life cycle (Figure 5.1, blocks 13
through 16). [Eef. 28: pp. 7-10]
B. ACQUISITION PROCESS AND COSI-EFFECTI VENESS ANALYSIS
1 . Acquisition Strategy in ROK
Acquisition means the acquiring by contract with
appropriate funds of supplies (including construction) by
and for the use of the Government through purchase, lease,
or barter, whether the supplies or services are already in
existence or must be created, developed, demonstrated, and
evaluated. Acquisition begins at the point when agency
needs are established and includes the description of
requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and
selection of sources, award of contracts, contract
financing, contract performance, contract administration,
and those technical and management functions directly
related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by
contract. [Ref- 53: p. 19.0]
Small countries are not normally capable of satis-
fying all their military needs through internal manufac-
turing due to a lack of domestic resources. The required
combination of large amounts of capital, raw materials,
advanced technology, and skilled manpower needed for the
establishment and operation of defense-oriented industries
can rarely be found in small countries [Ref. 55: p, 8]-
Even if these were present, learning curves argue against
small production levels.









In the concrete^ self- production comprises pure ESD
and production, copy production of the existing system, and
modification production. Co-production includes technology
import, license, royalty, and hardware import type. Direct
purchase can be classified by purchase route and condition.
Cooperative production involves joint production, joint
venture, and multi-national industry. Military aid is
divided into grant-aid and foreign military sale (FMS) . In
developing countries whose industry and economic power are
behind, self- production may not be the best alternative.
[Eef. 51: p. 124]
What is the best strategy? It depends on the
situation. Under the enemy's thjieat and time constraint for
self -production, direct purchase may be the best way. Also,
co-production may be a better stratejy because of limited
technology to produce high-level systems. Sometimes, joint
production was taken by allied nations to improve economical
benefits and strengthen the allied relationship.
Self-production of weapon system must be the ulti-
mate goal for EOK self-defense endeavor- ROK has concen-
trated on self- production since 1976, even if it has some
disadvantages such as more RSD and production cost, more
time, and higher failure probability during R&D. But, it
has advantages such as techno-economic effects to the other
industries, enhancement of people's morale, and inspiration
of self-defense spirit. Therefore, this thesis focuses on
the reguired decision-making during the acquisition cycle
when ROK selects the self-production strategy. [F.ef. 51:
pp. 105-126]
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2. Cost and Price in the Acquisition Process
The program acguisitioE cycle requires cost esti-
mating for each program phase in order to maintain total
program cost visibility. This cost visibility is required
to ensure adequate control as well as the basis for deci-
sions affecting the continuation and accomplishment of the
program objectives. [Ref . 56; p. 1 ]
The phases of the acquisition process consist of
evaluation and reconciliation of needs, exploration of
alternative systems, competitive demonstrations, full scale
development, test and evaluation, production, and deployment
and operation. Since acquisition costing varies aniong
organizations, an attempt to describe fully and precisely
costing in the acquisition process throughout the Government
would be too detailed. It is sufficient to present an over-
view of costing and pricing functions in the respective
phases of the acquisition process and to differentiate these
functions with respect to their uses in planning, budgeting
and contracting. [Ref. 54: p. 3]
The conceptual phase of the acquisition cycle iden-
tifies the needs and goals for a new system according to the
activity's mission and evaluates the means to satisfy these
mission needs. Hence, the basic need for a new system must
be identified and defined in terms of the mission need.
Current acquisition guidance stresses that the mission need
statement should not be expressed in terms of needed equip-
ment, but, instead, in terms of basic performance
requirements. Therefore, each a:;tivity should investigate
and compare the cost, effectiveness, and risks of alterna-
tive approaches to provide the bases for selection of one or
more systems which warrant further development to satisfy a
valid element need.
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The demonstration and validation phase of the acqui-
sition cycle begins once this need has been established. In
this phase, the major program characteristics of the system
such as technical, schedule, and cost requirements are
refined and validated through extensive study, analysis,
test, and evaluations. The objective is to validate the
choice of viable alternative systems or critical subsystems
and to provide a basis for selection of a system for full
scale development according to mission needs.
In the full-scale development phase and initial
production the mission need is again reaffirmed and the
validation results reviewed. Dpon completion, selection of
a system or equipment for full-scale engineering development
and initial production is approved, the principal items
necessary for support are designed, and a minimum number of
models are either constructed or simulated, tested, and
evaluated to provide actual performance data. Based on
results obtained in this phase, the system is defined in
terms of technical performance, schedule, and cost. A deci-
sion is then made on whether or not to proceed with full
scale production. Once the production phase is initiated,
the system is produced for operational use along with any
necessary supplies, training and support equipment.
[Eef. 5^: p. 4]
It should be apparent that the acquisition process
is a series of sequential steps. There is a steady progres-
sion from need determination to receipt and use of the
purchase equipment or service. Correspondingly, there is a
series of reviews, redeterminations, and adjustments to
accommodate to changes in need or resource availability.
The critical dependence of major systems acquisition plan-
ning on innovative and reliable cost estimating methodolo-
gies is recognized in today's acquisition management policy.
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Agencies acquiring major systems have to maintain a
capability to predict, review, assess, negotiate and monitor
cost in all phases of the life cycle. Continuous cost
predictions and subsequent reassessment must be considered
by the agency head at key decision points. On the basis of
estimated life-cycle costs, appropriate trade-offs can be
made among cost, schedules, and performance.
The acquisition of a major and complex system is a
series of iterations of the process shown in Figure 5.2.
This illustrated process is used by QS Federal Government.
The validation, full-scale development, and production
phases are each acquisitions in their own right. The same
actions are taken during each phase a costing and review
function is added between phases.
The acquisition process spans a number of tradi-
tional functions - planning, budgeting, contracting, and
contract administration. Each of these functions contains a
distinct area of specialization. The traditional functional
span in the acquisition process has produced a problem in
definition. The costing effort and techniques in the plan-
ning process differ from those used in the contracting
process. Therefore, we have defined the following terms for
use in this thesis. [Ref. 54: pp. 5-8]
1. Acquisition Costing - The total process of devel-
oping, preparemg, and monitoring a 'cost to the
Government' for goods or services. It encompasses
the activities of cost estimating, cost analysis and
price analysis.
2. Cost Estimating - The development of an expected
value or~nre "Eotal 'total to the Government' without
the knowledge or benefit of a definite bid for the
specific goods or services.
3. Contract Cost Analysis - The review and evaluation of
a cont!racfor"^s cost and pricing data to determine the
probable cost to the contractor to supply the goods
or services.
'^ • E^ice Analysis - The review, in varying detail, of a
prospective price, without evaluation of the separate
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^« Cost-Effecti veness (CE) Model
a. Overview
The development of a system or product that is
cost effective, within the constraints specified by opera-
tional and maintenance requirements, is a prime objective.
Cost effectiveness relates to the measure of a systec in
terms of mission fulfillment (system effectiveness) and
total life-cycle cost. Cost effectiveness, which is similar
to the standard cost-tenefit analysis employed for decision-
making purposes in many industrial and business applica-
tions, can be expressed in various terms (i.e., one or more
figures of merit) , defending on the specific mission or
system parameters that one wishes to measure. The prime
ingredients of cost effectiveness are illustrated in Figure
5.3. [Ref. 28: pp. 21-22]
Cost-effectiveness analysis provides a concep-
tual framework and methodology for systematic investigation
of alternatives. It enables the user to choose the
preferred alternative out of many approaches. By applying
the analysis procedure, it becomes possible to select the
optimal alternative for achievement of the goals defined
within the allowed constraint boundaries such as budget.
Of these two elements, cost is easier to measure
and handle because it can be expressed by a single, monetary
value. Effectiveness is harder to deal with. It can be
presented both in terms of certain parameters which have
clear-cut numerical representations and others which are not
readily quantifiable. This section concentrates on quanti-
fiable effectiveness measures that can be defines by mathe-
matical formulas and expressions, such as Operational
Availability.
It is recognized that political, social, and
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Figure 5-3 Priae Cost-Effectiveness Elements,
any decision process [Ref. 55: pp. 22-23]. However, their
treatment is considered to be of such complexity as to be
beyond the scope of this thesis. The following section
describes cost and effectiveness terms with regard to a
procurement decision process,
b. System Effectiveness
System effectiveness is often expressed as one
or more figures of merit representing the extent to which
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the system is able to perforin the intended function. The
figures of merit used may vary considerably depending on the
type of system and its mission requirements, and should
consider the following: [Ref. 28: p. 20]
T • System performance fiarameters, such as the capacity
ox a power planT, range Dr weignt of an airplane,
destructive capauility of a weapon, quantity of
letters processed through a postal system, amount of
cargo delivered by a transportation system, and the
accuracy of a radar capability.
2- Availability;, or the measure of the degree a system
IS m fne operable and ccmmittable state at the start
of a mission when the nission is called for at an
unknown random point in time. This is often called
"operational readiness." Availability is a function
of operating time (reliability) and downtime
(maintainability/support ability) .
3. Dependability, or the measure of the system operating
conHif^ion a"E one or more points during the mission,
given the system condition at the start of the
mission (i.e., availability). Dependability is a
function of operating time (reliability) and downtime
(maintainability/support ability) .
A combination of the foregoing considerations
(measures) represents the system effectiveness aspect of
total cost effectiveness. 3y inspection, one can see that
logistics impacts the various elements of system effective-
ness to a significant degree, - particularly in the areas of
availability and dependability. System operation is highly
dependent on support equipment (handling equipment), oper-
ating personnel, data, and facilities. Maintenance and
system downtime are based on the availability of test and
support equipment, spare/repair parts, maintenance
personnel, data, and facilities. The effect of the type and
quantity of logistic support is measured through the parame-
ters of system effectiveness. [Ref. 28: p. 21]
In recent years, a variety of models and defini-
tions of system effectiveness have been developed using
different concepts of effectiveness. These models base
their measures upon combinations of terms such as mission
reliability, operational readiness, availability, design
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adequacy, capability and utilization. Among all these
terms, availability is the one of the most commonly used,
and will be emphasized in this part because of its logis-
tical importance.
Although several types of availability are
defined (Inherent, Achieved, and Operational), the one
considered to be important for effectiveness evaluation
purposes during the use period of the system is Operational
Availability (Ao) . It is more closely related to the actual
operational environment than the other two measures and is
affected more by user decisions than the others. It is
defined as: [Eef. 55: pp. 23-2^4]
MTBM
o MTBM + MET
where, MTBT = Mean-Time Between Maintenance Actions
MDT = Mean Down Time
Availability concerns itself with the operating-
time (Reliability) and down-time (Maintainability), both
being system design c-haracteristics . In dealing with elec-
tronic systems, the failure rate (a) can often be considered
as constant through the use period. It enables one to fit a
Poisson distribution to the number of failures which occur
during a given time interval in a system. As a consequence,
the times to failure can be described by an exponential
distribution. Reliability is defined to be the probability
that the system survives over a given time interval. It is
therefore a function of time (t) and can be described mathe-
matically by the formula:
-Xt -t/MTBF
R (t) = e = e
where, MTBF = Mean Time Between Failures
\ = Failure Rate
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The design for maintainability directly affects
many of the resources needed for performance of the support
activities during the life cycle. These play a major role
in determination of life-cycle cost, accounting for more
than the procurement cost. In particular, MDT includes all
time elements needed to retain the system or restore it to
an operational condition (preventive and corrective mainte-
nance) as well as administrative and logistic times. The
user should minimize those aspects of these time elements
within his control if he expects to maximize the operational
availability.
Experience has shown that reliability and main-
tainability predictions provided by the manufacturer tend to
be over-optimistic. The value of the MTBF/ even if proven
in a demonstration test, usually turns out to be several
times lower when the system is placed in the actual opera-
tional environment. In addition, actual repair times
obtained in the field, exceed up to several times those of a
maintainability demonstration. These facts should be seri-
ously considered when using reliability and maintainability
data for effectiveness and cost predictions, and when
applying cost-effectiveness analysis. [ Ref . 55: pp. 26-27]
c. Life-Cycle Cost
Life-Cycle Cost includes the cost associated
with all system activities pertaining to research and devel-
opment, design, test and evaluation, production, construc-
tion, product distribution, system operation, sustaining
maintenance and logistic support, and system retirement and
disposal [Ref- 28: p- 67], The development of the LCC for
use in system evaluation was motivated by the fact that the
major part of user budgets are spent on operations and
support activities [Ref, 55: p, 27],
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LCC is of particular siynificance in the defini-
tion of logistic support requirement, since the costs asso-
ciated with the system support are increasing at an alarming
rate and often exceed the cost of system acquisition
[Eef. 28: p. 68]. The main motivation behind the LCC method
is to make trade-offs possible which enable savings to be
made during the use period by increasing expenditures during
the acquisition period, and thus to lower the total cost of
the system.
In developing life-cycle cost figures and
computing total cost, several steps are required. These
will be suggested more thoroughly in the following section.
d. Cost-Effectiveness Trade-offs
Any system is a result of trade-offs and compro-
mises performed during different phases of its development
and use. These trade-offs may be divided into two major
categories.
The first category, system effectiveness trade-
offs, includes those pertaining to various characteristics
of the system, such as reliability, maintainability, and
availability. It is possible to produce a highly reliable
(low failure rate) or a highly maintainable system (quickly
restored), but the same operational availability may also be
achieved by trade-offs between these two. The most suitable
balance between them may be based on the relative costs.
Another category includes trade-offs among cost
categories. Higher investments during the RSD phase may
reduce production costs, and both may increase or decrease
expenditures during the use period of the system (OSS
costs)
.
These two major categories usually do not occur
independently of one another. Decisions with regard to
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module size, repair policies (maintenance level and repair
vs. discard), types of maintenance (corrective vs. preven-
tive) , level of automation, human factors (man vs.
machine) , and packaging influence costs as well as system
performance. As a consequence, the composite or cost-
effectiveness balance should be sought which allows the user
to have the best system possible subject to technological
and budgetary constraints. In cases where equipment is
bought 'off the shelf,' the spectrum of trade-offs is
limited because many design features are already built into
the system. [Eef. 55: pp. 30-31]
C. APPLICATIONS OF ICC MODEL
When HCK Army considers the development of weapon
system, it must decide between the appropriate alternatives.
In this case, cost estimating plays an important role in the
analysis of alternatives. This section describes the basic
elements and general basic concepts to all cost estimates,
costing method and a common frame work for life-cycle cost
estimates. Finally, this thesis suggests a sample example
for acquisition decision.
T • Basic Elemen ts to all Cost Estimates
At certain milestones throughout the acquisition
process, a decision is to be made based on the probable
life-cycle cost of acquisition (e.g., between alternative
systems, whether to start production, etc.). This decision
must be made based on the amount of data available to the
analyst at the moment [Eef. 5U : p. 12]. The critical depen-
dence of major systems acquisition planning on cost esti-
mating methodologies can be recognized in today's
acquisition management policy in ROK military. To do cost
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estimating successfully, organization, data and analysts are
essential factors. T7e can make cost estimating and analysis
organization immediately, but it takes long time to collect
available data and to train good analysts.
One of the most vitally important steps in the cost
estimating is to assemble an appropriate data base [Eef. 57:
p. 130]. The as government has been collecting cost and
program data on weapon and support systems for many years -
sometimes in detail, sometimes in highly aggregated form.
Consequently, it is surprising that the right data seldom
seem to be available when an estimating job is required
[Eef. 58: p. 11]- Since the data problem is fundamental,
the EOK military should establish the effective data base
system. We note that of the total time involved in the
process of developing cost estinating, more effort is typi-
cally devoted to the assembly of a consistent data base than
anything else. ROK military also devotes a considerable
effort to making good analysts. What a cost analyst is:
[Ref. 59: p. 1.1]
1. A cost analyst is an individual qualified through
formal training and work experiences to provide to
management the most credible and realistic cost
estimates.
2. A cost analyst is broad-gauged and management
oriented, which is to say he is interested in antici-
pating and identifing issues of management import.
3. A cost analyst is a mult idisciplined professional who
employs operations research, engineering and econo-
metric techni'^ues to prepare, evaluate and validate
cost estimates.
4. A cost analyst is interested in assuring that the
overall cost to the Government of materiel systems,
forces, units and activities is presented m ways
which yield cost realism and thereby improve the
allocation and management of Array resources at all
levels.
5. A cost analyst is product oriented, conducting cost
research and analysis, and producing technical papers
and reports containing findings and, where appro-
priate, recommendations.
120
In conclusion, the effective and efficient organiza-
tion, appropriate data and skillful analysts are essential
to make the best analysis on acquisition alternatives in the
RCK military.
2. General Basic Concepts to all Cost Estimates
a. Inflation and Discounting
Inflation and discounting can both be used to
modify future costs to present costs [Ref. 55: p. 186].
Inflation is the term applied to upward movement of price
levels overtime. Discounting is a technique for converting
various cash flows (cost streams) to economically comparable
amounts at a common point in time, considering the time
value of money [Ref. 59: pp. 5.1-5.2]. Various cost esti-
mates can te presented either in "current dollars" or in
"constant dollars", with the first preferred [Ref. 55: p.
186].
The effect of inflation and discounting can be
combined into an adjustment factor for each year's cost by





where, AF = adjustment factor
i = average inflation rate/yr
d = average discount rate/yr^^
Usually, military organizations do not have a
predictable stream of revenues. Therefore, the present
value method can be modified into a discounting method
[Ref. 55: p. 187].
39The current discount rate specificied
the Secretary of Defense is 10 percent.
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by JS Office of
h. Sunk Costs and Inherited Assets
Sunk cost is the summation of all past expendi-
tures or irrevocably committed funds related to a given cost
estimates. So, sunk costs are generally not relevant to
decision-making as they reflect previous choices rather than
current choices, but sunk costs can become relevant in cases
where they represent assets that would be employed in lieu
of new assets in some cost-effectiveness analysis.
The use of assets already in the military inven-
tory (inherited assets) requires careful evaluation during
the conduct of cost analysis. Each inherited asset must be
evaluated on its own merits and in terms of whether its use
in connection with the system or force being costed will
cause future expense to the military. If it does cause a
future cost, that expense must be included in some cost
element in the estimate. If it does not, it should be
treated as sunk cost. [Ref. 59; p. 5.1]
c. Range versus Point Estimates
The use of a point estimate does not reflect the
uncertainty associated with the estimate. It also implies
that it is a precise cost. For these reasons, a range of
cost should be provided based on the inherent cost esti-
mating uncertainty. The level at which the ranges can be
provided is dependent upon the level at which the costs are
estimated. Within the limitations imposed by the data base
and cost estimating approach employed, ranges should be
presented at the highest aggregate level.
In addition, an analysis should be made of the
sensitivity of projected costs to all critical assumptions.
This should include factors such as the impact of changes in
performance characteristics, changes in configuration to
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meet performance requirements, schedule alterations and
alternative production processes. Therefore, a cost sensi-
tivity analysis should be provided in terms of high and low
estimate assumptions. [Ref. 61: p. 3.0]
d. Treatment of Dncertainty
Uncertainties in estimates of resource require-
ments for future systems arise from many sources. We can
consider two categories of uncertainty: requirements uncer-
tainty and cost-estimating uncertainty. Requirement uncer-
tainty refers to variations in cost estimates stemming from
changes in the configuration of the system being costed. We
note that uncertainty about requirement comprises 70 to 80
percent of total estimate uncertainty in the US military.
[Ref. 62: p. 1]
Cost-estimating uncertainty refers to variations
in cost estimates of a system for which the configuration is
essentially fixed. It can arise from a variety of causes.
In an overall context, the following might be singled out:
errors in data, errors in cost-estimating relationships, and
extrapolation errors. [Ref. 58: pp. 131-133]
Treatment of uncertainty in cost analysis has
been studied in terms of various methods: cost sensitivity
analysis, variance analysis, and Monte Carlo techniques*
o
[Ref. 58: pp. 133-154]-
^OfRef. 58] describes cost sensitivity analysis, vari-
ance analysis, and Monte Carlo method in details.
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e. Learning Curve
For many years the aerospace industry in the US
has made use of what variously have been called "learning",
"progress", "improvement", or "experience" curves to predict
reductions in cost as the number of items produced
increases. Thesedays, the learning process is a phenomenon
that prevails in many industries in the world; its existence
has been verified by empirical data and controlled tests.
Although there are several hypotheses on the exact manner in
which the learning or cost reduction can occur, the basis of
learning-curve theory is that each time the total guantity
of items produced doubles, the cost per item is reduced to a
constant percentage of its previous cost. [Eef. 58: p- 93]
Therefore, we should draw an cumulative average
learning curve rate or a unit learning curve rate which can
be applied to the increase in production efficiency, in so
far as costs subject to the learning function are concerned.
This rate approximates an "80* curve" which means that when
guantities of production are doubled on item, cumulative
average man-hours should be reduced 20% [Eef- 53: p. 9].
The relationship between cost and quantity may
be represented by a power (log-linear) equation of the form
[Ref. 58: pp. 96-97].
Y = AX




the cost of the first unit produced (the same)
the slope of the learning curve (the same)
the cost of the Xth unit (the average cost of
the X units)
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^ • Co St Estimating Method
A cost estimate is a jud^'ement or opinion regarding
the cost of an object, commodity, or service [ Hef . 58: p.
1]. In the early planning and budgeting stages of now
acguisitions, no bid or proposal is usually available for
analysis, hence, cost estimating must normally be used
[Ref. 54: p. 13].
The challenge to cost analysts concerned with mili-
tary hardware is to project from the known to the unknown,
to use experience on existing equipment to predict the cost
of advanced weapon systems: Korean indigenous missiles,
aircrafts, tanks and APCs. The techniques used for esti-
mating hardware cost range from intuition at one extreme to
a detailed application of labor and material cost standards
at the other [Ref. 58: pp. 1-2]. The techniques of cost
estimating may be grouped into four generic categories:
analogy, expert opinion, parametric and engineering
estimates [Ref. 54: p. 13].
a. Analogy
This method is based on tne premise that the
current acquisition is identical or very similar to previous
acguisitions. A comparison and analysis is made of any
similarities at either the component or parts level. To
make the comparison the costs associated with the previous
acquisition must be verified and justified, then adjusted
for inflation by using cost indices. The analyst should
review the level of technology employed and reflect these in
his estimate. Adjustments should be made for any changes in
specifications, quantities, or delivery schedules.
Estimating by analogy is used primarily when
there are very few similar systems- The data must be care-
fully classified by type of article to be acquired. This
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classifying mast be sufficiently detailed to allow careful
comparison of both total systems and various subsystems.
Since these subsystem components could be in totally unre-
lated systems (e.g., a power source for an airborne radar
system could be identical to one required for a ground radio
jammer)/ it is necessary, or at least desirable, to classify
by each separate logical subsystem level. Data sources
should include a history of all recent acquisitions, cata-
logs, and federal supply schedules and should not be limited
to acquisitions of the department or agency seeking the
information. [Bef. 54: pp. 13-14]
The major drawback to estimating by analogy is
that it is essentially a judgement process and, as a conse-
quence, requires considerable experience and expertise to be
done successfully. However, for the military cost analyst,
analogy can be useful for a rough check of an estimate.
Because a private concern generally has informa-
tion only on its own products, much of the estimating in
industry is based on analogy, particularly when a firm is
venturing into a new area. For example, in the 1950s, the
'OS Douglas aircraft company (ilcdonnel-Douglas) made a good
estimate on the Thor intermediate range ballistic missile by
comparing Thor with the DC-U transport airplane. [Ref. 58:
pp. 6-7]
b. Expert Opinion
Another technique of estimating is the applica-
tion of expert opinion. In its simplest form, this approach
to estimating consists of an individual providing a probable
cost based on personal knowledge of similar items or the
amount of work needed to perform a task. More often a
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modified Delphi method* i is employed, where a panel of
experts each provide their rationale for an expected cost
and argue their respective viewpoints until a general
consensus is achieved. The ma j cr drawback, to this technique
is the inability to find an expert or to support the results
with any quantitative analysis or data. Expert opinion
relies on personal estimates using such concepts as "more
than" and "less than" rather than factual knowledge of
detailed work inputs and dollar costs. This type of esti-
mating technique results in a broad estimate or roand order
of magnitude employed in the earliest stages of the acquisi-
tion process when very little data is available. [Eef. 54:
p. 14]
c. Industrial Engineering Procedure
Estimating by industrial engineering procedures
can be broadly defined as an examination of separate
segments of work at a low level of detail and a synthesis of
the many detailed estimates intc a total [Eef. 58: p. 2],
So, the total cost of an hardware is the sum of the costs of
all of its elements. These elements include material,
labor, indirect costs, overhead and profit. To use engi-
neering detail, it is necessary to be at)le to estimate the
required work input and material for each subtask. This
information is often arrayed in the form of a work breakdown
structure. Once all the material and labor requirements
have been inserted, each requirement is priced and summed to
arrive at the total cost for a job. Thus, small percentage
errors in each of the detailed estimates can result in
large absolute errors in the total. [ Ref . 54: p. 16]
*iDelphi method is the procedure that the judgements are
made independently and anonymously, pooled, summarized, and
then fed back to the judges for another round of opinion.
More detail is in [Eef, 5l].
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Industrial engineering estimating procedures
reguire considerably more personnel and data than are likely
to be available to government agencies under an^ foreseeaisle
conditions [Eef. 58: p. 5]. In a complicated hardware case,
they take much time and are costly to both contractor and
government during a period of limited funds. .Moreover, for
many purposes they have been found to be less accurate than
estimates made statistically [ Ref . 58: p. 5]. However,
engineering methods are most appropriate when the military
has responsibility for design and preparation of detailed
specifications [Ref. 54; p. 16].
d. Statistical Procedure (Parametric)
In the statistical approach, estimating rela-
tionships that use explanatory variables such as weight,
speed, power, freguency, and thrust are relied on to predict
cost at a higher level of aggregation than the industrial
engineering [Ref. 58; p. 2].
The relationship that a variable has to cost is
called a cost estimating relationship (CER) . The CER is
often expressed as a mathematical egua tion(lin3ar or nonli-
near) that allows the estimator to project the cost of an
item with a value of the explanatory variable that differs
from those currently available.
Data requirements for parametric estimating are
extensive. The cost estimator must recognize which vari-
ables have a valid relationship to cost. Once developed,
CER's must be continually updated and refined as new data is
obtained. The new data adds to the data base allowing the
CER to become more useful. It is evident that CER's may be
constrained by the need for a suitable data base of similar
systems. Although parametric analysis may be used through
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the acquisition cycle, it must be used extensively during
the conceptual and validation phases.
Parametric costing is thought to be a more reli-
able method than expert opinion, and probably more reliable
than analogous costing. The reason is most likely more a
function of definition and use than fact. [ Ref . 54: p. 15]
Although statistical procedures are preferable
in most situations, there are circumstances when analogy or
industrial engineering techniques are required because the
data do not provide a systematic historical casis for esti-
mating cost behavior on a combination [Ref. 58: p. 7].
In conclusion, in any situation the estimating
procedure to be used should be determined by the data avail-
able, the purpose of the estimate, and, to an extent, by
such other factors as the time available to make an
estimate. The essential idea to be conveyed in this section
is that, when properly applied, statistical procedures are
varied and flexible enough to be useful in most situations
that ROK military analysts are likely to encounter.
Although no specified set of procedures can guarantee accu-
racy, decisions must be made: it is essential that they be
based on the best possible information. The analyst must
seek the approaches that will provide the bast possible
answers, given the basic information that is available.
[Ref. 58 : p, 9]
4 . A Common Framework for life-Cycle Cost Estimates
So far, the general methods of estimating a new
weapon system cost have been introduced. General conception-
of life-cycle cost described in the previous section. We
need a complete, detailed and fully documental estimate of
system life-cycle costs accomplished by the system proponent
(weapon system project manager) , but overall study is beyond
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the purpose of this thesis. This section describes general
guidelines and procedures for a system life-cycle cost
estimates.
a. A General Guide for LCC
In developing LCC figures, one of the first step
is to construct a cost breakdown structure (CBS) , a life-
cycle CBS is an ordered breakdown of the components of LCC,
which represent an accounting model for LCC estimates.
Although a standard life-cycle CBS does not exist, many
common elements are included in a lot of them. The first
breakdown level includes usually four categories: Research
and Development, Investment, Operations and Support, and
Hetirement and Disposal Cost [Ref. 55: p. 187]. A possible
life-cycle CBS is illustrated in Figure 5.4 [Ref- 28: p.
68].
The second step is estimate each cost by
category in the CBS. Cost analyst must consider the effects
of inflation, learning curves, and any other factors that
are lixely to cause changes in cost, upward or downward.
Cost estimates are derived from a combination of accounting
records (historical data), project cost projections, supply
proposals, and predictions.
A common framework for general cost estimates
can be evolved under the following criteria: [ Eef - 65: P.
2.0].
1. It must be compatible with both top-down and
bottoms-up cost estimating approaches. The framework
must not, by its composition, preclude use of either
approach. It must be compatible with cost analysis
policy and convention.
2. It must capture 100 percent of costs. It must be
comprehensive but not necessarily detailed.
3. It must be manageable in size. Simplification in
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There are a lot of weapon systems in the ROK
Army. A weapon system can be broken down into the several
specific system types: aircraft, missile, surface vehicle,
electronic and ordnance system. Each specific system can
also be broken down into several functional components: fire
control, armament, peculiar support e^^uipment, common
support equipment, and so on. So, life-cycle cost estimate
should be conducted in all functional components of each
specific system. The life-cycle cost estimates for discus-
sion of system in general is presented in Figure 5.6.
[Ref. 65: p, 2.5]
The next step is to compute and to add each cost
for each year in the system life cycle by general equations.
The following section make explicit a common framework for
cost computations. Individual first-level cost factors,
estimated for each year in the life cycle in terms of the
actual anticipated cost for that year (i.e., inflated cost),
are totaled and projected in the context of a cost profile
illustrated in Figure 5.7 [Ref- 28: p. 73]. This profile
reflects future life-cycle budgetary requirements for the
system.
The next step is to evaluate alternatives. Each
alternative configuration is represented by a different cost
profile, since cost-generating activities will vary from one
instance to the next, reliability and maintainability
factors will be different, and the specific logistic support
requirements will be unique for each situation. Figure 5.5
reflects the cost profiles for three potential system
configurations being considered for a single application.
[Ref. 28: p. 68]
The comparison of various possible courses of
action requires that the cost associated with alternatives
in question be compared on an equivalent basis (i.e., the
point in time when the decision is to be made, which is
132
System Lite Cycle, Years
Figure 5.5 Life-Cycle Cost Profiles of Alternatives.
generally considered as the present time or now) . Thus, the
costs for each year in the life cycle (for each profile
being evaluated) are discounted to the present value. Final
decision can be made at the decision point in terms of the
comparison of each present value, if each effectiveness
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Figure 5,7 A Life-Cjcle Cost Profile.
135
b. Research and Development (R&D) Costs
The term, "R&D cost", is generally defined to be
the sum of all costs resulting from applied research, engi-
neering design, analysis, development, test, evaluation and
managing development efforts related to a specific weapon
system. The R&D costs incurred during the acquisition
process of a weapon system represent major commitments of
resources. Clearly, these relatively large costs warrant
comprehensive review during the acquisition process.
Specific reasons why R&D cost estimates are needed are:
[Eef. 65: p. 1.2]
1- To permit labor savings.
2. To permit trade-offs between life cycle phases.
3. To achieve better balance between equipment purchase
and repair.
U. To perform better comparisons between new materiel
systems.
5. To provide management visibility of critical resource
requirements.
The R&D cost elements are listed in Table VIII
with elements numbers to indicate first and second level of
indenture elements. The second level elements sum to the
first level elements of the R&D cost. [Ref. 65: pp-
2.0-2.2]
As a practical matter, the second level of F.&D
costs should be computed. Therefore, 10 general equtions
are needed to compute each element of second level. Each
equation illustrates the philosophy of parametric estimating
and comprises several highly aggregated factors including
one or more requirements factors and cost factors. For
example, development engineering (1 . 1 ) equation is as
follows:
Development Average number of




Research and Development Cost Elements
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1.0
mb er Ccst Element






1.06 System Test and Evaluation
1.07 System/Project Management
1.08 Training Services and Eguipment
1.09 Facili ties
1. 10 Other
Supporting each factor is the detailed work done
Ly the analyst. For instance, the analyst may estimate the
number of engineering man-years per equipment by using a
statistical relationship, based on historical data from
similar systems. The RSD cost documentation must take clear
exactly what is being costed, where the factors come from,
and how the results are calculated [Ref. 65: p. 6.1]- The
R8D cost estimating equations (1.01 through 1.10) are
presented in [Ref. 65].
c. Investment Costs
Investment costs cccur during the production
phase. The non-recurring costs of this category include
tooling, support and test equipment, manufacturing planning,
new facilities training and recruitment, while the recurring
costs include manufacturing labcr, material, inspection, and
support equipment maintenance. These costs are charged
directly to a particular part/equipment produced, while
other costs, such as building maintenance, supervision.
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clerical personnel, and accounting costs are accumulated and
allocated to each part/equipment as overhead. [Eef. 55: p.
189]
The investment cost elements are listed in Table
IX with element numbers to indicate first and second level
of indenture elements [Ref. 65: p, 2.5]. The second level

































Initial spares and repair part
Transportation
Other
The investment requirements initially stem from
system operational data developed during advanced planning
and conceptual design, and subsequently are refined througn
the system design process. The investment requirements also
vary considerably depending on the type of system, available
capacity in the producer's plant and supporting resource
needs, management decisions pertaining to "make or buy", and
so on. [fief. 28: p. 260]
To compute The investment costs, 11 general
equations are needed. These general equations are explained
[Ref. 64].
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d. Operating and Support (OSS) Cost
The term, "Life Cycle O&S Cost", is defined to
be the sum of all costs resulting from the operation, main-
tenance and support {including personnel support) of the
weapon system after it is accepted into the Army inventory.
The O&S cost build-up begins when the first production
egaipment enters the active cr reserve force structure
either as operating unit ecuipment or combat crew training
equipment. The OSS costs normally will be based on an
assumed authorized strength with full authorized et^uipment
in a peacetime environment. [Ref. 61: pp. 2.1-2.2]
The O&S costs incurred during the useful life of
a weapon system may exceed its production cost. Clearly,
these high costs warrant comprehensive review during the
acquisition process. Several specific reasons why O&S cost
estimates are needed are as follows: [Ref. 61: p. 1.1]
1. To permit personnel savings.
2. To evaluate the potential cost performance trade-offs
and engineering changes.
3. To achieve better balance between equipment purchase
and repair.
4. To perform better comparisons between materiel
systems
.
5. To provide management visibility of critical resource
requirement s.
The operating and support cost elements are
listed in Table X with element numbers (S.xxx) to indicate
first, second and third level of indenture elements
[Ref. 61: p. 2.4].
The third level elenents sum to the second level
elements, the second level elements sum to the first level
elements of the O&S costs. To compute O&S costs, 13 equa-
tions are needed. Each equation illustrates the philosophy
of O&S cost estimating, in that the equations consists of
several highly aggregated factors including one or more
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requirements factors and cost factors. The 05S cost esti-
mating equations are explained in [Bef. 61: pp. 6.1-6-5]-
For instance. Maintenance pay and allowances
cost (3-012) shows the quantity of operational equipment,
number of maintenance men per operational equipment, average
annual cost per maintenance man, and the number of years of
operation. Supporting each factor is the detailed work done
by the analyst. The analyst may estimate the number of
maintenance men per equipment ty using a statistical rela-
tionship, or reliability data from prototypes. The O&s cost
documentation must make clear exactly who and what is being
costed, where the factors come from, and how the results are
calculated. [Ref. 6 1: p. 6-0]
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e. Retirement and Disposal Cost
Disposal of hardware is a one-time cost, and it
is logically related to the acquisition of the item, even
though it may be far removed in time. If disposal costs are
addressed at all in a life-cycle cost estimate, they should
be mentioned (together with a discussion of residual value)
in the investment phase. [Eef- 61: p. 2.4]
f. Applying LCC for Decision-maker
This section explains a simple example for the
acquisition decision process which the Army may face in
these days. The data*2 utilized in this thesis is ficti-
tious and serves only to provide a example of cost-
effectiveness analysis.
Colonel Kim, head of the Attack: Helicopters
Mission Analysis Group(AHMAG) is trying to analyze possible
armament changes for the Army*£ attack helicopter, because
improvements in enemy vehicle hardening had created a
requirement for improved air offensive capabilities in close
support of troops in addition to other available weapons.
The new system is named as the Attack Helicopter Close
Support and Penetration System (THCPEN) . At the present
time, the Army helicopter units have consisted of four
.50-caliber machine gun mounts per attack helicopter. Each
of these guns could fire 300 rounds per minute (a sustai-
nable rate) for a total of 1200 rounds per minute on target.
Three alternative improvements are under
consideration. The present system is excluded in alterna-
tive consideration, because the Army needs strongly the
improvement armament for the attack helicopter units. Three
*2Most of data are derived from the class material for
the System Analysis course by Prof. Dan Boger in the NPGS.
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alternatives are as fellows:
1 Two .50-caliber pods with 4 barrels per pod. Each
barrel could fire 200 rounds per minute giving a
total of 1600 rounds per minute for the two pods.
The .50-caliber round used in the pod had greater
range, velocity, and penetrating power than the round
currently used.
Two 25 millimeter (mm) cannons. This cannon had
recently been ^developed and successfully tested by a
well-known ordnance manufacturer,
fire 150 rounds per minute for a
per minute. This cannon had
destructive power than either of
systems.
Each cannon could
total of 300 rounds
greater range and
the other two gun
Two Stubby Rocket (STUEECC)
rockets which could
pods. Each pod held 42
be fired either singly or in
groups/sticks. In general, the STU3R0C had similar
range and destructive power to the 25mm cannon but
the reliability of its xiring mechanism was suspect.
Col. Kim was sitting at his desk going ever a
report sent to him from another analyst for Attack
Helicopters Offensive Modifications. The report took issue
that two 25mm would lead to a greater increase in effective-
ness than the .50-caliber or the SiaBROC.
The effectiveness, measured by the probability
of enemy vehicle destruction, is as follows:
1. Two .50-caliber pods
2- Two 25mm cannons




Col. Kim agreed that under the assumptions made
by another analyst, the 25mm cannon would increase the
THCPEN system* s effectiveness more than the other
alternatives. However, he thought the cost-effectiveness
analysis was better method for the modification decision.
At that time. Col. Kim also received another report, which
was made by Mr. Lee, civilian analyst. Mr. Lee estimated
the procurement costs of a squadron for the alternatives as
follows:
1. Two .50-caliber pods: $4.0 million
2- Two 25mm cannon : $6.5 million
3. Two STUBROC pods : $12.0 million
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Mr. Lee then took the ratio of costs to effectiveness for
each alternatives:
1. Two .50-caliber pods: $4.0 million/. 17 1 = 23.4
2. Two 25mm cannons : $6.5 million/. 236 = 29.7
3. Two STaBROC pods : $12.0 million/. 207 = 58.0
Since the .50-caliher pod had the lowest cost
per unit of effectiveness, Mr. Lee recommended the two
.SO-caliber pods rather than the two 25mm cannons and two
STUBEOC.
After going over Mr. Lee's report. Col. Kim
thought that the attempt to determine the cost-effectiveness
of the proposed alternatives was a good idea bat there were
some problems in calculating costs. Mr. Lee considered only
the procurement cost of each alternative. So, Col. Kim
decided to perform a life-cycle cost estimating methodology
on the alternatives. The RSD cost is considered as sunk
cost, therefore. Col. Kim estimated the two first-level
costs of each alternatives: Investment costs and Operation
and Support costs.
The investment costs were estimated as follows:
1. Procurement and installation of two .50-caliber pods
$10,5 million
2. Procurement and installation of two 25mm cannons$15-0 million
3. Procurement and installation of two STQBROC pods$26.0 million
To compute the OSS costs, the following data
were collected. The two .50-caliber pods would require 30
men for armament and maintenance, the two 25mffi cannons would
require 6 men and the two STQBRCC pods would require 24 men.
Manpower cost of each alternative was derived from above
data.
The spares and repair parts estimate for the
STOBROC was derived from a CER of annual costs of spares and
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repair parts for various Air-to-Surface rocket systems
plotted as a function of the acquisition cost of the orig-
inal system. A line was fitted to the points for prediction
purposes:
1
Y = X + 20,000
100
since the procurement cost of STUBROC is $ 12.0
million, the cost of spares and repair parts was estimated
as $ 140,000. The spares and repair parts costs for the
.50-caliber and 25mm cannon were derived from another
existing systems. In addition. Col. Kim estimated inventory
costs, transportation and storage, training, publications
and maintenance (depot and intermediate)
.
A six year life cycle, a ^0% interest rate and a
6% inflation rate were assumed. Costs of each alternatives
are shown in Table XII. Table XII gives the projected cash
flow for the three alternative systems.
Total present value cost are represented in
TABLE XI









Table XI. Thus, it seems to Ccl. Kim that on the basis of
minimum total life-cycle costs and the highest effective-














































tot 10, 500 6,889 11,434
i
10,500 8,168
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VI. CONCIDSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our final goal on the Korean peninsula is to keep peace
first, and then to establish "reunification" peacefully. To
reach this goal, the Republic cf Korea has tried with great
effort. However, the environment of ROK has changed dramat-
ically according to the attitudes of North Korea and the
relationship between neighboring super-powers.
The EOK has some difficulties such as the big military
imbalance, uncertainty of US defense policy, geography and
logistics. How do we overcome these problems and then reach
our final goal? Possible alternatives are many, but the
most challenge is to improve military logistics. The reason
is that one of the weakness in the ROK military is
logistics. After the Korean War, considerable efforts and
studies have been devoted toward the development of credible
strategic and tactical doctrine. Throughout this process,
military logistics has been relegated to a category of
secondary importance. Fortunately, these days the HOK mili-
tary leaders has begun to recognize the importance of
logistics,
I?hat are needed urgently for the improvement of the ROK
military logistics in current situations are:
1. First of all, the military commanders and planners,
especially in the higher ranking levels, must under-
stand the concept of modern military logistics more
fully. Until now, the idea that military logistics
supports the weapon or that, in fact, logistics
provides "support" still prevails. These attitudes
for military logistics have been become the big
obstacle in improving military force- Now, it is
time to discard these obsolete attitudes. Military
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logistics is the cornerstone of the military forces
in that: (1) It provides combat forces with the
capability of waging war; (2) It is very related to
the nation's economic growth; (3) It provides
tangible evidence of military power in deterring a
military threat; (U) It limits and shapes the strat-
egies and tactics that can be implemented during the
waging of war; (5) Its effectiveness directly impacts
the cost and capability of military forces; (6) It
indicates that a valid assessment of the enemy's
"logistics capability" will provide a theatre
commander with a great deal more information than
only knowing the number and placement of their
forces.
2. ROK Army has to concentrate on the development of ILS
system which can be considered to increase the oper-
ability of forces and enhance their readiness. ILS
comprises all the support considerations necessary to
assure the effective and economical support of a
system or equipment at all levels of maintenance for
its programmed life cycle. Development of ILS for a
new system or equipment shall be initiated concur-
rently with the performance requirements or at the
earliest possible time in the conceptual phase.
Moreover, the evolution of logistic support, that is
the integration of its elements, shall be the result
of progressive system analysis of the plan for use
and the plan for support and the indicated trade-offs
between these plans. Therefore, the ROK Army can
take advantage of ILS system as a management tool in
developing life-cycle logistics support during the
acquisition cycle. Also, it is very important to
emphasize the training of ILS manpower and the team-
work between customer units and direct support unit
including the industrial base.
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3- The ROK Army might be equipped by weapon systems
through the various acquisition methods; self-
production, co-production, direct purchase, coopera-
tive production, military aid, and mixed type. The
best strategy depends on the situation of ROK mili-
tary. The ROK military has concentrated on self-
production since 1976, even if it has some
disadvantages such as mere R&D and production cost,
more time, and higher failure probability during R&D.
But, it has some advantages such as techno-economic
effects to the other industries and inspiration of
self-defense spirit. In developing the acquisition
strategy of self-production, the ROK Army must decide
the appropriate alternatives in terms of cost-
effectiveness analysis. In this case, cost esti-
mating plays an important role. The apparent fact is
that the operating and support costs of any weapon
systems are increasing at an alarming rate and often
exceed the cost of system acquisition. This requires
that the life-cycle cost estimating methodologies
must be recognized in today's acquisition management
policy in the ROK Army. The best decision can be
made based on the amount of data available to the
analysts at the moment. Therefore, organization,
data and analysts are essential factors in order to
do cost estimates successfully. In addition, we need
a complete, detailed and fully documented estimate of
system life-cycle cost.
There are many more factors that must be considered by
the ROK Army in order to impr.ove the military power.
However, the above recommendations should be examined in
depth and accepted properly by the ROK Army. As a result,
we hope this thesis helps the ECK Army to improve the logis-
tics field in peacetime as well as wartime.
148
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Shannon McCune, Korea *s Eeritag.© (A Regional S Social
Geography) , Charles E. Tulfle Company ,~T9'ErD'.
2. Kim Seong Jin, A Hand Eook of Korea, Ministry of
Culture and Information, 1'57S'.
3. Ernest W. Lefeuer, "Withdrawl from Korea: A Perplexing
Decision," Strategic Review, Winter 1973.
U. Stuart E- Johnson and Joseph A. Yager, The Military
Equation in Northeast Asia, The Brooxings Institution,
5. Ha, C. S. , A Pro£osed Logistics Strategy for the
Defense of Re pullc oJ Korea, U.S. TlTesis, Naval
FosEgraduaTe S'cT^oI, June~T5Ba.
6. United States Military Posture for FY 1585, The
Organization of EEe^JoInt cEIeTs oF Starf, T January
1984.
7. N- F. Wikner, "What the Hell is Kim Il-sung up to?"
Armed For ces J ournal, September 19 84.
8. William E. Smith, South Korea, The American University
Washington, D.C., 1^E7.
9. William E. Smith, North Kcrea, The American University
Washington, D.C., T5HT.
10. Donald R. Cotter and N. F. Wikner, "Korea: Force
Imbalances and Remedies," Strategic Review, Spring
J. 9 82. ~ ~
11- liiliia:£I Balance (1283-1984), The International
Institute Tor Strategic Siu3Ies, Spring 1983.
12. Gluck Fred, "Military logistics: Toward Improved
Effectiveness," Logistics Spectrum, Winter 1982.
13. Henry E. Eccles, "Logistics - What is it? (1953),"
Logistics Spectrum, Summer 1982.
14. Mike Tharp, "Vision of the North Korea," Far Ea ster n
lS2I12li2§/ February 19 84.
149
15. Strategic Survex (1283-1984), The International
XnsIiruEe for BTrategic S^clies, Spring 1984.
16. Kim kyu-taik "A Centary of Close Ties and Friendship:
EOK - US," Korea News Review, May 22, 1982.
17. James I. Matray, "Korea: Test Case of Containment in
Asia," Child of Conflict Brace Cumings, ed.
,
University oT WasHingTon Tress, 1983.
18- Robert Leckie, Conflict (The History of the Korean
War, 1950-53) , G. P. Pui^nams'^s Sons New York, 19^77
19- Facts on File: World News Diqest with Index, Facts on
File, IQC, Vol XXVIII, No TO^, April T^-2^ 1968.
20- Bernard K. Gordon, Major Powers and Korea, Besearcli
Institute on Korean Allalrs, T^7I.
21. Melvin R. Laird, The Nixon Doctrine, AEIPPR
Washington, D. C. , 1972.
22. Gluck Fred, "Military logistics: A Multitude of Sins,"
Logistics Spectrum, Fall 1979.
23. Warren Rose, Logistics Hanaqement Systems and
Components, Wm. C. Brown Co., J^TS.
24. Sun Tzu Wu, Sun Tzu on the Art of War, London Luzac,
19 10. "
25. Ronald E. Latham, Revised Medieval Latin Word List,
London: Oxford University Press, l^Z'5.
26. Graham W. Rider, "Evolution of the Concept of
Logistics," Na val War College Review, December 1970.
27- George C. Thrope, Pure Ii23.istics, Kansas City Mo.:
Franklin Hudson, 1917.
28. Benjamin S. Blanchard, Logistics Engineering and
Management, 2nd ed. , Pren tice-Hall, 193"!.
29. Gluck Fred, "The Necessity for Understanding Military
Logistics," Logistics Spectrum, Fall 19 82.
30. Mitchell Simpon III, War, Strategy, and Mar itim e
Power, Rutegers University Press, T5/7.
31. Arthur J. Gregg, "Logistics and Force Readiness," Army
Logistician, November-December 1979.
150
32. Hobert A. Bobulinski, A Stud^ of an ILS Ap2lication on
a Surfaces hi£ New ConsjEr uc^ion Procirams, M.'S. TITesis,
I7avaI"~FosrgraduaI^e ScTiool, December T^76.
33. Robert P. Legg, An Overview of ILS in Medical Material
Prog ram, M.S. Thesis, Naval PostgraH^uate Sc"EooT,
UecemEer 1980.
34. Laurence J. Peter. "Lifting the Fog Around ILS," Army
Lqgistician, November-December 1976.
35. Logistics and Technical Training Division:
Wright-Patterson Air force Base, Final Report,
Technqlog_y_ Projection: Manpower and Logistic Factors
Tn~T7eapon System Development, By Gordon a. TcksTraiTd,
5:ugus^ T58U7-
36 Peter C. Dirkx, ILS plan for Swimmer Delivery Veh icle s
(SDV) EX VIII and EX IX M.S. Tnssrs, Naval
Postgraduate ScTiooI, June 197^1.
37. Donald Schotz, "Applying ILS," Armx ii2.ii§1i ci an
,
January-February 1977.
38. Richard F. Gordon^ "Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
Planning," Logistics S pectrum , Winter 1983.
39. .Bruce C. Clarke, "Logis ticians Must Be Leaders Too,"
Army Logistician, July -August 1933-
40. John R. Galvin, "Grass Roots Logistics," Army
Logistician, July-August 19 84.
41. Richard H. Thompson, "Hew to Succeed in Logistics,"
Army Logistician, September-October 1981.
42. Operations^ FH 100-5, Headquarters Department of the
Army, ^asHmgton, D.C., 20 August 1982.
43. Richard H. Thompson, "Army Logistics Directions and
Objectives for the 1980's," Arm_y Logistician,
November-December 1981.
44. Gary D. Allen, "Training Logistics Units
Successfully," Army Logistician, November-December
19 82. ~
45. Paul H. Fournia, "Precommanded Courses for
Logisticians, " Armx Logisticia n, January-February
1982.
46. Kimberley T. Smith, "Logistics Wargaming," Army
Logistician, January-February 1982.
151
47. Richard D. Webster, "Industrial Logistics
Considerations for Improved DoD Integrated Logistic
Support," Logistics S£ectrum, Winter 1975.
48. Marvin H. Baker, "Eeadiness Teamwork," Army
Loqistician, May- June 19 8 1.
49. David H. Morgan, "Integrated Logistics Support
Management Team," Army Loqistician, September-October
1982.
50. Emery C. Harmon, "Logistics R5D Program," Army
Loqistician, November-December 1933.
51. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea,
Optimization Study for Weapon System Acquis itio n
g"anagement, Stuay-76-3, 1 S7F.
52. Joseph J. Addison, "The Logic in Logistics - Part
III," Logistics Sp ectrum , Summer 1976.
53. DoD SuE^ly. Management Reference Book, Defense
Logistics Agency, April 198T.
54. Executive Office of the President-office of Management
and Budget: Office of Federal Procurement Policy
Federal Acquisition Institute, Costing Methods ana
Models for Acquisition Planning,
~E!i?^§Oll5 ang
Con'Eracti.ng, April T9'7'?.
55. "Viggo Dam Nielson and Haim Shahal Apglication of Life
Support Cost, Provisioning, and Re£air/Drscard MoHeis
fo ^ea£on S^ysjem Procurement" decisions E_y ^aiaiT
Coun'Eries, E.'E. Thesis, JTaval Pos'E'grad^uate ScHooI,
HecenTBer 1981.
56. Cost Estimating in the Navy, January 1976.
57. Gene H. Fisher, Cost Considerations in Sy stem s
Analysis, Amer " ^"' " "^ ^--t-t-_t--_ _ ^
I7ew Yoric, 1971
ican Elsevier PuEIisEing Company, inc.
,
58. C. A. Batchelder, An Introduction to Equipment Cost
Estimating,, the Eand CorporaEion, December 19'E'9.
59. The Cost Analysis Program, AR 11-18, Headquarters
Department o? tEe Army, T December 1975.
60. M. E. Seldon, Life C^cle Costing: A Better Method of




61. 0£eratin£ and Su££ort Ccst ^uide for Army Materiel
S^stemSy Pam l^-^, IJepar'Eicent of Tae Iriay, April T?7o.
62. Paul F. Dienemann, 2sti eating Cost Uncertainty using
Monte Carlo Techniques, tne Rand Corporation, January
1V6E7
63. Lacklin Aircraft Com£any^, EA-C 304E (case study).
Harvard Business ScEooI, 1955.
64. Investment Cost £uide for Army Materiel Systems, Pam
TT^, Department or Ihe Army, Hay 1'91'E.
65. Research and Development Cost IJiide for Army, Materiel




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 223 14
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
3. Department Chairman. Code 54 1
Dept. of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
4. Professor P. M, Carrick, Cede 54 Ca 2
Dept. of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
5. Professor M. G. Sovereign, Code 55 Zo 2
Dept. of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943




7. Major Tae Kyo, Kim 7
Army Logistics School
Seoul, Korea 130-14
8. Office of the Defense Attache 1
Embassy of the Republic of Korea
2320 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20008
9. Lie. Jeong Soo, lee 2
Logistics Service Attach
Embassv of the Eepublic of Korea
2400 T7ilson Blvd.
Arlington, VA 2220 1
10. Col. Hong Byun 1
Korean Liaison Office
TRADOC Field Element
Ft. Monroe, VA 23651
11- Col. Philip Y. Browning, Jr 1
Commander, HQs Command
Fort Ord, CA 93941
12. Library Officer 2
Korea Military Academy











A proposal of lo-
gistics development






A proposal of lo-
gistics development
for Republic of Korea
Army.

